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INTRODUCTION

The concept of terrorism is multidimensional. Terrorism is
fundamentally a strategy employed by state and sub-state actors to
achieve political, military, or ideological goals. 1 Its apparent
pervasiveness is facilitated by the global proliferation of explosives,
weapons (of minor and mass destruction), and know-how. Terrorism
can precipitate, herald, and occur independently of a state of war. At
times, terrorism appears to be an inevitable feature of situations of
asymmetrical warfare, governmental repression, unwelcome occupation, and other putatively unjust international relations that spawn
grievances and seething discontent among the populace. Regardless
of its context, terrorism is a phenomenon with profound sociological
implications. Terrorism also has pressing and divergent human
rights dimensions, where innocent civilians are deliberately targeted
with violence and counter-terrorism measures-including the use of
domestic surveillance, the development of arbitrary and preventative
detention regimes, the withholding of rights to habeas corpus and
judicial review, the resort to punitive immigration remedies, and the
use of torture, other forms of cruel treatment, disappearances, and
extraordinary renditions against suspected terrorists-impinge on
civil and human rights. 2 Certain manifestations of terrorism also
constitute international and domestic crimes, as set forth in a web of
1. See Alex P. Schmid, The Response Problem as a Definition Problem, in
WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 7, 8 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten

eds., 1993) ("Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,
employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic,
criminal or political reasons, whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct
targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of
violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message
generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought.").
2. Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (2008);
Naomi Norberg, A Harmonized Approach to Combating InternationalTerrorism?
Roadwork Ahead, in LES CHEM[NS DE L'HARMONISATION PENALE 203, 204 (2008)
(Fr.) (discussing the growing rift between human rights and counterterrorism
regimes and the global harmonization of abusive counter-terrorism tactics).
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multilateral treaties and the world's domestic penal codes. This
Article aims to consider an altogether different dimension of terrorism: the extent to which terrorism is also a tort-specifically, a "tort
3
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
This Article will focus on the potential of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) to serve as a vehicle for asserting civil claims in U.S.
courts for acts of terrorism. 4 Although this Article primarily
considers terrorism torts under the "law of nations" prong of the
ATS (which requires a showing that the relevant prohibition is part
of customary international law), terrorism torts may provide a
vehicle for activating the ATS's dormant treaty prong as well, given
the strong support for the terrorism treaties exhibited by the United
States and the high degree of domestic incorporation of the crimes
delineated therein. One of the first modem cases to be filed under
the Alien Tort Statute immediately called into question the utility of
the ATS as a counter-terrorism tool. 5 Ever since, the statute has been
relatively underutilized in this context, even while U.S. courts have
gradually extended jurisdiction under the ATS over other international crimes. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has vastly expanded
opportunities for U.S. nationals to pursue civil claims in domestic
courts for acts of terrorism. For example, the Antiterrorism Act
(ATA) enables U.S. nationals-as well as their estates, survivors,
and heirs-to sue individuals responsible for personal, property, or
business injuries incurred by reason of acts of international
terrorism. 6 U.S. victims and claimants may also sue states and state
3.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
4.

This focus on the ATS excludes lengthy consideration of suits against

states and other defendants that are entitled to foreign sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, or
suits brought under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519,
sec. 132(b), § 2333, 104 Stat. 2250, 2251 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2333

(2006)), which applies only where U.S. nationals are the victims of acts of
terrorism defined in Title 18.
5. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (dismissing action brought by Israeli citizens against Libyan Arab Republic
and various organizations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
6.

Antiterrorism Act of 1990 sec. 132(b), § 2333, 104 Stat. at 2251 (codified

at 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (Supp. 11 1991)). Although there were prior permutations of
the Antiterrorism Act, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100HeinOnline -- 28 Rev. Litig. 383 2008-2009
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agents implicated in acts of terrorism under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FSIA), 7 so long as the state itself has been
specifically designated as a "sponsor of terrorism" by the Department of State or where the circumstances otherwise satisfy one of the

codified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. As compared
with these statutory causes of action for U.S. citizen victims and
claimants, only the ATS has the potential to provide jurisdiction over
civil claims arising out of acts of terrorism brought by non-nationals
who have access to U.S. courts. The uncertainty surrounding the
availability of the ATS to permit such terrorism claims reveals a
lacuna in the United States' anti-terrorism statutory scheme.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain8 and finally set forth a methodology for
considering actionable claims under the ATS, a few cases involving
terrorism allegations have begun to work their way through the
federal court system. Although it is still difficult to draw broad
conclusions, the existing cases demonstrate that the various federal
statutes-the ATA, FSIA, and ATS-can work in tandem to provide
causes of action to alien and U.S. plaintiffs injured in terrorist
incidents. 9 Furthermore, litigants are creatively utilizing multiple
causes of action drawn from statutes, the common law, and intema-

204, §§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1406, 1406-07, the 1990 version first created a
private cause of action for acts of terrorism for U.S. citizens. This Act was
repealed in 1991. Act of Apr. 10, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-27, § 402, 105 Stat. 130,
155. Congress re-enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 thru 2338 in 1992, but without a
specific short title. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102572, § 1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521-24. For ease of reference, this Article will use
"ATA" to designate the civil cause of action set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (withholding sovereign immunity under
enumerated circumstances); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West Supp. 2008) (creating a
cause of action against state sponsors of terrorism). Section 1605A originally
appeared at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), which withheld sovereign immunity for
designated state sponsors of terrorism. The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 deleted § 1605(a)(7), Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(b)(1), 122
Stat. 3, 341, but re-codified the provision with amendments, id, § 1083(a), 122
Stat. at 338-41 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A).
8. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
9. See Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., No. 09-20225-CIV-SEITZ
/MCALILEY, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92778, at *3-6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2006) (in
a suit by U.S. and non-U.S. citizens, invoking both the ATA and ATS,
respectively).
HeinOnline -- 28 Rev. Litig. 384 2008-2009
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tional law to press their claims.1° While the federal courts have yet
to definitively recognize a standalone cause of action for terrorism
stricto sensu, developments in the law of terrorism at the international level reveal the gradual crystallization of a consensus set of
elements that comprise a definitive prohibition against terrorism
applicable to all but a narrow set of circumstances. What lingering
definitional impasse exists highlights an unsettled and highly
contentious area of international law: the legal categorization and
consequences of attacks by unprivileged combatants against privileged combatants or military targets. In all other situations, the
international law governing acts of terrorism is sufficiently precise,
robust, and uncontroversial to support the recognition by the federal
courts of a cause of action for terrorism under the ATS, assuming the
other jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. Recognizing such
causes of action will bolster the United States' counter-terrorism
regime by enabling a broader array of victims of acts of terror to
pursue the assets of individuals and groups that finance or otherwise
support acts of terrorism.

II.

THE JURISPRUDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO
ADJUDICATING TERRORISM TORTS IN UNITED STATES COURTS

A.

Tel-Oren v. Libya: A False Start

Any inquiry into the cognizability of the tort of terrorism
under the ATS invites a re-examination of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic," the first case to consider claims of civil liability for acts
of terrorism in the United States. Tel-Oren was also one of the first
cases to be adjudicated following the Second Circuit's landmark
ruling in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,1 which invigorated the ATS as a
tool for the private enforcement of civil claims for torts committed in
violation of international law. Tel-Oren arose out of a horrific attack
in Israel in 1978 in which members of the Palestine Liberation
10. See, e.g., Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 415-16 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(alleging various claims arising under international law and common law in an
action against the CIA involving the torture and murder of a Guatemalan rebel).
11. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
12. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Organization (PLO) took 121 civilians hostage in a torturous
rampage around the city of Haifa. 13 Before the Israeli police could
stop the attackers, twenty-two adults and twelve children were killed,
and eighty-seven people were injured. 14 Plaintiffs (U.S. and Israeli
citizens) brought suit against Libya, the PLO, and other non-governmental organizations associated with the PLO, whom they accused
of masterminding the attack. 15 Plaintiffs premised jurisdiction on the
ATS, as well as on federal question and diversity grounds, and
advanced claims
of torture, terrorism, genocide, and other pendant
16
domestic torts.
The district court dismissed the case, reasoning that plaintiffs
had identified no cause of action in U.S. or international law entitling
them to sue. 17 In a terse per curiam opinion, the D.C. Circuit
affirmed, although the judges splintered in their reasoning. 18 Judge
Edwards was the most faithful to the newly-minted Filartiga
precedent. 19 He agreed in principle that the ATS allowed for the
assertion of civil claims based on international law violations.20 He
reasoned, however, that the law of nations, as it then existed, did not
21
impose liability on private actors to the same degree as state actors.
He also concluded that terrorist attacks did not necessarily violate the
law of nations,2 2 because there was too much dissension within the

13. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776.

14. Id. at 776, 799.
15. Id.
at 775.
16. Id.
17. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 549-51 (D.D.C.
1981).
18. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.

19. Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 795.
21. Id. at 791.
22. Id. at 795; see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 97 (2d Cir.
2003) (per curiam) ("[C]ustomary international law currently does not provide for
the prosecution of 'terrorist' acts under the universality principle, in part due to the
failure of States to achieve anything like consensus on the definition of terrorism."); id. at 106-08 (detailing efforts at the international level to define
terrorism); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 806-08 (Bork, J., concurring) (finding little

consensus on the illegality of terrorism).
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international community as to the legality and legitimacy of such
acts.23

By contrast, Judge Bork rejected the Filartiga precedent
outright.24 He reasoned that § 1350 only supported jurisdiction over
those law of nations' offenses that existed at common law as identified in Blackstone's famous treatise-violations of safe conduct, acts
of piracy, and infringements on the rights of internationally protected
persons, such as diplomats.25 Judge Bork rejected the argument that
the ATS provided a cause of action for additional international law
violations and argued that neither the various treaties cited by
plaintiffs nor customary international law enabled plaintiffs to sue
for the torts alleged.2 6
Judge Robb took a different approach altogether by arguing
that the case presented a non-justiciable political question. 27 He
determined that the question of liability was one for the political
branches of government, as there were no judicially discoverable
standards by which to resolve the dispute.28 Given this formidable
trilogy of arguments, Tel-Oren stood for many years as a barrier to
subsequent terrorism-related suits under the ATS.
The D.C.
Circuit's fractured opinion also blocked the development of a
unanimous national interpretation of the ATS, as all other circuits to
face challenges to the ATS fell in line behind the Second Circuit.2 9
23. Judge Edwards referenced United Nations instruments that in his
estimation demonstrated that members of the international community considered
some actions that might be considered terrorism to constitute legitimate acts of
aggression or retaliation within certain political contexts. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
795 (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the
Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist
Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103); see also id. at 795 ("While this nation unequivocally
condemns all terrorist attacks, that sentiment is not universal .... Given this
division, I do not believe that under current law terrorist attacks amount to law of
nations violations.").
24. Id. at 808-10 (Bork, J., concurring).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the ATS established a federal forum where courts could address
customary international law violations by using domestic common law remedies);
Kadic v. Karadi6, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that there was subject
matter jurisdiction under the ATS because torts allegedly committed by the
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As a result, Tel-Oren emerged as a favorite citation in scholarship
and briefs opposed to ATS litigation.
B.

The Legislative Reaction

Whereas Tel-Oren may have discouraged litigants, it
mobilized Congress.
On the terrorism front, Congress partially
overturned Tel-Oren by specifically creating a civil cause of action
for U.S. citizen victims or their heirs or survivors 3 1 injured by reason
of an act of international terrorism 32 as part of the Antiterrorism Act
of 1990. 33 Specifically, the relevant provision provides:
defendant were in violation of international law); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged
behavior was not undertaken due to an official mandate and thus was not covered
by FSIA's agency provision); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp.
362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to
adequately allege a violation of the law of nations, but assuming jurisdiction in
principle), affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
30. To bolster the ATS, Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991 (TVPA), a statute providing a federal cause of action for acts of torture
and summary execution committed against either aliens or United States citizens.
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (2000) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2006) (Torture Victim Protection)). Passage of the TVPA followed the United
States' ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which obligates state parties to provide
reparations to victims of torture. Art. 14, done Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. For more on the TVPA's legislative history, see
Robert F. Drinan & Teresa T. Kuo, Putting the World's Oppressors on Trial: The
Torture Victim ProtectionAct, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 605, 609-10 (1993). The TVPA
House Report made reference to Tel-Oren when it announced that the TVPA
would "provide a federal cause of action" against individuals who, "under actual
or apparent authority or color of law of any foreign nation," subject anyone to
torture or summary execution. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), as reprintedin
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86-87.
31. By limiting standing to U.S. citizens, the civil terrorism statute reflects
the passive personality principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which has become
more accepted in light of the greater attention to acts of international terrorism.
32. The ATA was also a response to a case that involved civil claims arising
out of an act of terrorism against a U.S. citizen that could proceed in U.S. courts
only because the murder occurred on a ship, triggering admiralty jurisdiction and
the Death on the High Seas Act. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed AltriGestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp.
854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). The Klinghoffer
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Any national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors,
or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district
court of the United States and shall recover threefold
the damages he or she sustains
and the cost of the suit,
34
fees.
attorney's
including
"International terrorism" is defined to encompass activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, or transcend national boundaries
in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
intimidate or coerce, or the locale
in which their
35
asylum.
seek
or
operate
perpetrators
case eventually settled, reportedly for millions of dollars. With the ATA,
Congress expressed its intention to extend liability for acts of terrorism that occur
on foreign territories and to "'empower victims with all the weapons available in
civil litigation."' Debra H. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front:
Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through
Federal Statutory and Common Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679, 684
(2002) (quoting 137 CONG. REc. S4511-04 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Grassley)).
33. Pub. L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250, 2250-53 (amending 18
U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338 (Supp. I 1991)).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006).
35. Id. § 2331(1).
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Acts of war--defined as "(A) declared war; (B) armed conflict,
whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations;
or (C) armed conflict between military forces of any origin" 36 -are
not actionable under the statute.37 By defining "international terrorism" with reference to conduct that merely "involves" violence, the
ATA enables civil claims for even non-violent acts that have been
made criminal under federal law, such as those crimes set out in the
various "material support" statutes.38 Indeed, any violation of the

36. Id. § 2331(4).
37. Id. § 2336(a) ("No action shall be maintained under section 2333 of this
title for injury or loss by reason of an act of war."); see Estate of Klieman v.
Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D.D.C. 2006) (ruling as a matter of
law that attack on a civilian bus---"an act that violates established norms of
warfare and armed conflict under international law"-was not "an act occurring in
the course of armed conflict," without deciding question of perpetrators' military
status); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333-34 (D. Utah 2006)
(concluding that attack on soldier as pleaded by plaintiffs did not constitute an act
of war, because al Qaeda was not a "military force"); Biton v. Palestinian Interim
Self-Gov't Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting existence of armed
conflict in Gaza, but concluding that an attack on children in a school bus could
not be committed "during the course of' an armed conflict, which would have
brought the case into the ATA act-of-war exception).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (defining the term "material support or
resources" to include the provision of any property, service, currency, monetary
instruments, financial securities, or financial service); id. § 2339B(a)(1)
(prohibiting knowingly providing material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization); id. § 2339C(a)(1) (making it a crime to unlawfully and
willfully provide or collect funds, directly or indirectly, intending or knowing that
such funds will be used to carry out an act that constitutes an offense within the
scope of enumerated terrorism treaties or any other act intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to a person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict); see also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst.,
291 F.3d 1000, 1011, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that § 2333 allows a U.S.
national injured by reason of international terrorism to recover from anyone along
the causal chain, including individuals or entities that provide money or other
forms of support); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580-81
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleging violations of § 2339 (providing material support to
terrorists) as well as § 2332 (aiding and abetting and conspiring in the murder,
attempted murder, and serious bodily injury of United States nationals)). The U.S.
government intervened as an amicus in Boim to confirm that the ATA incorporated
basic tort principles, including aiding and abetting liability. See Hamish Hume &
Gordon Dwyer Todd, Ambulance Chasingfor Justice: How Private Lawsuits for
Civil Damages Can Help Combat InternationalTerror, FEDERALIST SoC'Y, Dec.
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penal provisions in Title 18 may serve as the predicate acts for civil
suits under the ATA, so long as the necessary attendant circumstances-i.e., the motivation 39 and transnational elements4°--exist.
Thus, civil liability under the ATA for U.S. citizen plaintiffs is at
41
least as extensive as criminal liability.
Individuals may also sue for any economic or personal injury,
such as mental suffering or loss of consortium, even absent physical
harm.42 The ATA applies to natural or legal persons as defendants,43
but principles of foreign sovereign immunity dictate that actions may
1, 2003, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/publD. 118/pub detail.asp (discussing brief).
39. See, e.g., Estate of Klieman, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (noting defendants'
argument that the attacks in question were aimed at ending an illegal occupation
within Israel and thus did not reflect one of the prohibited intentions).
40. In Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the court determined that the
attacks of September 11th qualified as "international terrorism," even though they
"occurred primarily" within the United States, because they "transcend[ed]
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they [were] accomplished...
or the locale in which their perpetrators operate." 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). Smith was the first suit to be filed after the attacks. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated additional suits subsequently filed
against various individuals, charitable organizations, governmental agents and
entities, and financial institutions. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
41. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015, 1020 (noting that the language and
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2333 suggest that it includes tort liability for a
host of international terrorism crimes). The ATA further provides for nationwide
service of process and that suit may be brought "in the district court of the United
States for any district where any plaintiff resides or where any defendant resides or
is served, or has an agent." 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (2006). Personal jurisdiction has
been found where defendants have minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole. Estate of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76,
88 (D.R.I. 2001).
42. See Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172,
181-82 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that wife of victim could be a claimant even
where she could not sue as a survivor).
43. In § 813 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
382 (2001), Congress also envisioned terrorism as a form of organized crime and
amended the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute to
enable acts of terrorism to serve as predicate acts for a pattern of racketeering
activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (including reference to "any provision listed in
§ 2332b(g)(5)(B)," which includes a lengthy list of federal terrorism crimes, such
as the use of chemical weapons, kidnapping, cybercrime, assassination, attacks on
transportation networks, etc.).
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not proceed against "a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or
an officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting
' 4
within his or her official capacity or under color of legal authority. "
Individual state actors can, however, be sued in their personal
capacities for acts that are beyond their official mandates.4 5 The
U.S. Government is entitled to stay actions where they may interfere
with a criminal prosecution involving the same subject matter or a
national security operation.4 6 Most cases under the ATA have ended
in default, although defendants do occasionally file preliminary
defensive motions.4 7
The ATA's legislative history makes clear Congress's view
of the utility of civil suits for terrorism. For one, Congress sought to
ensure a remedy where criminal charges may not be brought and to
make terrorism "unprofitable" by allowing victims to constitute
themselves as private attorneys general and seek the assets of
48
individuals and entities supporting or financing acts of terrorism.
The hope was that allowing civil liability would provide an extra

44. 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2); see Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing claims brought
under ATA against Libya, its intelligence service, and individual defendants sued
in their official capacities).
45. See Hurst v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 474 F. Supp. 2d
19, 29 (D.D.C. 2007) (recognizing that an individual may be sued in a personal
capacity under the ATA); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
defendant not entitled to foreign sovereign immunity, because the alleged acts of
torture, summary execution, and disappearance were "not taken within any official
mandate"). See generally Jack Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation
and InternationalTerrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM 109 (John
Norton Moore ed., 2004) (making distinction between FSIA state actors and nonFSIA state actors).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2336(c) ("The Attorney General may intervene in any civil
action brought under section 2333 for the purpose of seeking a stay of the civil
action.").
47. See John R. Crook, United States Supports Dismissal of U.S. POW's
Billion-Dollar Default Judgment Against Iraq; U.S. Supreme Court Denies
Certiorari, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 699, 699-701 (2005) (discussing the numerous
default judgments entered in civil terrorism lawsuits). But see Knox v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 248 F.R.D. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (allowing defendant to
reopen default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)
upon a change of political leadership).
48. H.R. REP. No. 102-1040, at 4 (1992).
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measure of deterrence, especially for entities that might financially
support acts of terrorism while not engaging in violent acts
directly.

49

In addition to the ATA, Congress has created a cause of
action against state sponsors of terrorism and their agents within the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).
Historically,
states were immune from suit, 5 1 subject to the whims of the

executive. Later, an inclination toward restrictive immunity that
withheld immunity for private acts of the state (jure gestionis) while

maintaining immunity over its public acts (jure imperii) emerged. In
1976, Congress enacted the FSIA in many respects to codify the
doctrine of restrictive immunity and depoliticize determinations of
sovereign immunity. The FSIA reaffirmed immunity as a default
defense in litigation against states 52 and their agencies or instrumentalities, 53 subject to a series of exceptions. 54 Enumerated exceptions
49. See generally Dean C. Alexander, Maritime Terrorism and Legal
Responses, 19 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 529 (1991) (noting that private sanctions
are an integral part of the U.S. regime against terrorism); Jennifer A. Rosenfeld,
Note, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing InternationalTerroriststo Justice
the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 726 (1992) (arguing that the
ATA allows plaintiffs to attack terrorists' assets, thereby weakening terrorist
funding).
50. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006). The FSIA provides the exclusive
basis to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state in any U.S. court. Argentine
Republic v. Amarada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
51. The Schooner Exch. v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812)
("One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to this independent sovereign station, though
not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to
him.").
52. Governmental entities that do not qualify for statehood are not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA. See Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 315 F. Supp.
2d 164, 180 (D.R.I. 2004) (finding the Palestinian Authority was not entitled to
immunity because it was not a recognized state and did not sufficiently control
Palestine).
53. The courts are split as to whether an individual may constitute an agency
or instrumentality of a state. Compare Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 07-1893, 2009
U.S. App. LEXIS 189, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2009) ("[W]e conclude that the
FSIA does not apply to individuals and, as a result, Samantar is not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA."), with Belhas v. Ya'Alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C.
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include situations in which a foreign state has "waived its immunity
either expressly or by implication," 55 cases in which "the action is
56
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States,"
and suits against a foreign state for "personal injury or death or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any
official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment.' ' 57 Before the civil suit can
proceed, the state in question must be afforded an opportunity to
arbitrate the case if the conduct in question occurred on the state's
territory.5 8 The FSIA also provides rules for service of process,59
personal jurisdiction,60 and the attachment and execution of
the
62
assets of foreign states. 61 Trial is by a judge, rather than a jury.
Cir. 2008) (concluding that defendant was acting as an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state), and In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d
71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering the term "agency or instrumentality" to be
broad enough to encompass "senior members of a foreign state's government").
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 ("Subject to existing international agreements to which
the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.").
55. Id. § 1605(a)(1).
56. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
57. Id. § 1605(a)(5); see Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing Pan Am 103 case against Libya on
grounds that case did not fall under any then-existing enumerated exception to
immunity). Once Congress amended the FSIA, the Lockerbie cases were refiled
against Libya and other defendants. See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 753-55 (2d Cir. 1998). Most of the cases settled for
payments of $10 million per victim. Hurst v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 474 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2007). Individuals not deemed to be
"wrongful death beneficiaries" sued separately. See id. at 23-24 ("Plaintiffs in the
present action ... were excluded from that settlement .... Plaintiffs claims were
remanded to this court.").
58. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(2)(iii) (West Supp. 2008).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1608.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 provides that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign
state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608
of this title." Many courts have interpreted this to mean that so long as service of
process is proper, no additional personal jurisdiction inquiry is necessary. See
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19, 20 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding
that a foreign state is not a "person" for due process purposes and that "the concept
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Largely in response to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, Congress amended the FSIA to create

an additional exception to immunity for acts of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources for such acts 63 as part of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).6 4 The exception is
only applicable to states designated by the State Department as
sponsors of terrorism, 65 effectively re-politicizing certain determinations of foreign sovereign immunity. 66 Additional legislative tinker-

ing 67 led to the creation of an express cause of action against individof 'minimum contacts' is inherently subsumed within the exceptions to immunity
defined by the [FSIA]."). But see Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 162 F. 3d 748, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the state sponsor of
terrorism exception did not automatically entail a finding of minimum contacts in
the same way that the commercial activities exception did and thus that the subject
matter and personal jurisdiction inquiries are not so intertwined).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
62. Id. § 1330(a).
63. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(1).
See generally Molora Vadnais, The
Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 199 (2000) (discussing the exception).
64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241.
65. The State Department identifies state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to
three statutory authorizations: (1) section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (2000); (2) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (2006); and (3) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d). This list originally included Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(6) (2002) (setting forth
prior list). During his time in office, President George W. Bush delisted Libya,
Iraq, and North Korea. See U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c 14151 .htm.
66. For a fuller discussion of this provision and the litigation thereunder, see
JENNIFER ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST
STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM (CRS Report for Congress No. RL 31258,
2008).
67. The legislation was initially interpreted to provide only for federal
jurisdiction and not for a private cause of action. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002). Through the so-called Flatow
Amendment (formally the Civil Liability for Acts of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Act), Congress sought to create an express cause of action as well. Pub. L. No.
104-208, sec. 101(c), § 583, 110 Stat. 3009-121, 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1605 note (2006) (Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism)).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, subsequently ruled that
Congress had not in fact created a cause of action against terrorist states
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ual officials, employees, and agents of designated foreign states
68
acting in their personal capacities and against the states themselves.
To bring suit, either the claimant or the victim must be a national of
the United States, a member of the U.S. armed forces, or a particular
type of employee or contractor of the U.S. government. 69 The
plaintiff need not, however, be a legal representative of the victim;
rather, the plaintiff can allege his or her own economic damages,
pain and suffering, claims for solatium, etc. 70 In situations in which
members of the armed forces are the victims of attack, some judges
have required a showing that the victims were serving in noncombatant roles at the time of injury, although this is not an express
requirement of the statute.7 1 A number of cases have proceeded
themselves, but only against their officials, employees, and agents and only when
these individuals were acting in their private-as opposed to official-capacities.
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Congress then passed a rider to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 (the so-called Lautenberg Amendment) to expressly create a federal
cause of action against terrorist states and to facilitate the enforcement of
judgments. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083(a), 122 Stat. 3, 338-41 (codified at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1605A). The legislation in effect seeks to hold foreign states vicariously liable for the actions of their officials, employees, and agents. Id.
68. Prior to the passage of § 1605A, the majority of courts had found causes
of action against states in state law. Specifically, courts interpreted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1606-which provides that "the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances"-as "a
'pass-through' to substantive causes of action against private individuals that may
exist in federal, state or international law." Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 248-49, 266 (D.D.C. 2006) (alleging claims of
wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, etc.
arising from an act of state-sponsored terrorism and summary execution). But see
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (dismissing case on
ground that plaintiffs had stated no cause of action).
69. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii).
70. Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 337-38 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 115 n.12 (D.D.C.
2005) (permitting recovery for all immediate family members for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
71. See, e.g., Estate of Heiser, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (finding that victims of
the 1996 Khobar towers attack were engaged in a peacetime deployment in Saudi
Arabia to monitor Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council
resolutions enforcing the cease-fire that had brought an end to the 1991 war with
Kuwait); Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2006)
(same); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60 (D.D.C. 2003)
(allowing suit to proceed because victims of the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing
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against Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Cuba. 72 President Bush later waived
the withholding of immunity for Iraq (2003),73 Libya (2006), 74 and
North Korea (2008). 75 Although Congress has specifically authowere engaged in a peacekeeping mission under peacetime rules of engagement).
For a fuller discussion of the propriety of recognizing terrorism claims by
members of the armed forces, see infra Part III.C.2.
72. See, e.g., Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64
(D.D.C. 1998) (suit against Iranian agents arising out of terrorist act in Lebanon by
Hezbollah, found to be financed by Iran); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.
Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (suit on behalf of families of those killed when
Cuban aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). Most of
these cases proceed in default. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d
38, 44 n.2 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting cases ending in default judgments). Where the
state defaults, plaintiff must still establish her claim or right to relief "by evidence
satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Some payments have been made to
plaintiffs, in part as a result of legislation releasing blocked assets and other funds
under the control of the U.S. Government. Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(f)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1543.
That legislation also repealed the ability of victims to receive punitive damages
against states. Id. § 2002(f)(2), 114 Stat. at 1543; 28 U.S.C. § 1606 ("As to any
claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity
under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof
shall not be liable for punitive damages."); see also ELSEA, supra note 66, at 70
(detailing amounts paid). For a discussion of these cases, see Keith Sealing, "State
Sponsors of Terrorism " Is a Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism Amendment
to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J.
119, 125, 127 (2003). There do not seem to be reported cases against Sudan or
Syria. Only one case appears to have been filed against North Korea to date. See
Massie v. Gov't of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, No. 06-00749,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104903 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2008) (in default proceeding,
holding state liable for kidnapping, imprisoning, and torturing crew members of a
U.S. military vessel in 1968).
73. Presidential Determination No. 2003-23, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,459 (May 7,
2003). See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(dismissing on other grounds, but finding jurisdiction was proper in suit by U.S.
prisoners of war held in Iraq, even though district court ruled after various Iraqi
sanctions were lifted).
74. Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, 71 Fed. Reg. 30,551 (May 12,
2006).
75. See Press Release, U.S. Department of State, U.S.-DPRK Agreement on
Denuclearization Verification Measures (Oct. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/oct/I 10922.htm (announcing the delisting of
North Korea). See generally LARRY NIKSCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
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rized such suits against state sponsors of terrorism, the executive
branch has at times intervened against such suits or blocked assets
from attachment to satisfy judgments.7 6
The U.S. statutory scheme thus contains interlocking
opportunities for U.S. citizens and claimants to sue individuals (both
non-state and state actors) and state sponsors of terrorism directly for
a variety of acts of international terrorism. In addition, where a state
or state actor commits an act of terrorism within the United States,
the domestic tort exception to immunity may apply,7 7 even absent
the state sponsor designation. 78 The Tel-Oren case coupled with
these subsequent statutory developments contributed to the underutilization of the ATS in the terrorism context. 79 In 2004, however,
the Supreme Court developed a definitive methodology for determining actionable claims under the "law of nations" prong of the ATS
Report for Congress
No. RL 30613, 2008) (detailing efforts to remove N. Korea from list of terrorist
states).
76. See John Norton Moore, Civil Litigation Against Terrorism: Neglected
SERVICE, NORTH KOREA: TERRORISM LIST REMOVAL? (CRS

Promise, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR (John Norton

Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., forthcoming 2009).
77. The noncommercial tort exception to foreign sovereign immunity allows
for suits "for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring
in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state
or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of
his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). The claim may not be based
upon "the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, regardless of whether the discretion be abused." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(5)(A); see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671-73
(D.D.C. 1980) (finding that the car bomb assassination in Washington, D.C. of
former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his assistant qualified as a
tortious act within the United States and could not constitute a discretionary
function given the clear rule against assassination).
78. See Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding victims
of embassy bombing attacks could not invoke commercial activities exception of
the FSIA to support jurisdiction over the state of Afghanistan where the alleged
activities were not the type performed by private parties engaged in commerce).
But see In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 89-90 (2d Cir.
2008) (reasoning that if the state sponsor of terrorism exception to immunity does
not apply, other exceptions should not serve as the basis for suit for terrorism
crimes).
79. Indeed, even the ATA was underutilized. It was a decade before the first
case, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, was filed. 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (2001),
aff'd 291 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
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that effectively overturned most of the D.C. Circuit judges' objections to jurisdiction in Tel-Oren.80 This development invites a
reconsideration of the potential for the ATS to support jurisdiction
over civil terrorism claims as violations of customary international
law. The extensive codification of terrorism crimes since Tel Oren
at the international and domestic levels also invites a consideration
into whether terrorism treaty crimes are sufficiently incorporated in
U.S. law to activate the ATS's treaty prong.
C.

Expanding Civil Terrorism Litigation Via the Alien
Tort Statute

Much of the judicial dissention in Tel-Oren was finally
resolved in 2004, when the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited
ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.81 Most importantly, the Supreme
Court ended a longstanding debate in the field and the academy as to
whether the ATS provided a private cause of action for international
law violations or whether the statute was primarily jurisdictional,
that is, only addressing the power of the court to hear a certain class
of case. The Court unanimously and unequivocally sided with the
latter position based on the ATS's placement in the Judiciary Act
and then Title 28, its text and the original use of the term
"cognizance," and the fact that the Framers would not have elided

80. See discussion supra Part I.
81. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Vis-A-vis other ATS cases, Sosa presented a unique
set of facts and procedural history. The plaintiff, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain,
had already been before the Supreme Court once as a criminal defendant after he
was abducted from Mexico in violation of a bilateral extradition treaty by agents of
the U.S. government, who suspected him of participating in the torture of a Drug
Enforcement Administration official. Id. at 698. Dr. Alvarez-Machain contested
his abduction from Mexico all the way up to the Supreme Court. Id. Overturning
both lower courts' rulings, the Supreme Court applied the male captus bene
detentus principle to hold that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction-although in
violation of an extant treaty--did not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over
the criminal charges against him. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 657 (1992). After winning a motion for acquittal, Dr. Alvarez-Machain
turned around and sued the U.S. government, along with Josd Francisco Sosa, one
of the Mexican nationals involved in his abduction, alleging among other things
that his kidnapping amounted to a tort in violation of the law of nations. Sosa, 542
U.S. at 698.
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the concepts of jurisdiction and cause of action. So, in this respect,
Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit was vindicated.
The Court did not stop there, however. In gleaning the First
Congress's intent in enacting the ATS, and by looking closely at the
interaction between the ATS and what it termed the "ambient law of
the era," the Court concluded that certain international law torts
would have been considered to be within federal common law at the
time of the drafting of the ATS.82 According to the Court's account,
although international law in 1789 primarily addressed the relations
between states, there were subsets of international law rules that
regulated the conduct of individuals and were amenable at that time
to a judicial remedy in the event of their breach.83 Some of these
rules dealt with the law merchant, admiralty law, and the law of
prize. 84 Other such rules were designed for the protection of individuals, but also touched upon state prerogatives.85 This latter set of
rules included the protections afforded ambassadors, the prohibitions
against acts of piracy, and the norms governing safe conduct.86 The
Court opined that violations of rules within this subset of
international law would have been actionable as international torts
under the ATS at the time of its drafting. 87 Therefore, the ATS
authorized federal jurisdiction and "the common law would provide
a cause of action for the modest number of international
law
88
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time."

82. Id.
at 714.
83. Id. at 714-15.
84. Id. at 715.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 724. Under this framework, the ATS provides federal jurisdiction,
international law provides the substantive standard or rule of decision, and the
remedy is judicially created. See William R. Casto, The New Federal Common
Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of InternationalLaw, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635,
640 (2006) (arguing that international law defines the substantive tort claim
whereas federal common law defines the remedy and all other rules of decision).
But see Aldana v. Del Monte, 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11 th Cir. 2005) (interpreting
(probably erroneously) the ATS as providing both jurisdiction and a cause of
action). This type of disaggregation has other parallels in federal law. In Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, for example, the
Court recognized common law causes of action for constitutional violations. 403
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This aspect of the opinion was unanimous. The Court then
split in considering the implications of the genesis of the ATS to
contemporary cases. A majority of the Court--excluding Justices
Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas-concluded that the statute operates
today much as it did in 1789, which is to say that it authorizes suits
in federal court where federal common law provides a private right
of action for certain tortious violations of international law giving
rise to individual responsibility. 89 The dissenters argued that it was
erroneous of the Court to grant a "discretionary power in the Federal
Judiciary to create causes90 of action for the enforcement of international-law-based norms."
In considering the current reach of the ATS, the Sosa
majority advocated a "restrained" approach toward the recognition of
modem causes of action under the ATS, but left the core of the
litigation largely intact. 91 It found this cautiously permissive
approach warranted by a "series of reasons." 92 These relate to the
recognition that the courts now openly acknowledge that engaging in
common-law lawmaking 93 sits uneasily with contemporary concepU.S. 388, 396 (1971). Congress also created a statutory right of action for such
violations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
89. The Court specifically noted that "modem international law is very much
concerned with ... questions" concerning the "limit[s] on the power of foreign
governments over their own citizens." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
90. Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 725, 728-29 (majority opinion) (advocating a "restrained" approach
and "judicial caution" to recognizing new causes of action of this kind and noting
that "great caution" must be exercised in deciding which "norms of today's law of
nations may ...be recognized legitimately by federal courts").
92. Id. at 725; see Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268
(2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (arguing that the courts need not
individually analyze each of these five reasons, because they are "already captured
by" the "'high bar to new private causes of action' set by the requirement that a
claim be accepted by the civilized world and defined with a sufficient degree of
specificity" (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727)).
93. This portion of the Court's opinion seems at times to conflate two distinct
concepts: the federal common law and the now extinct "general law" first
endorsed by the Court in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See Sosa, 542
U.S. at 725-26 (invoking concepts of the general law and common law interchangeably). The latter once reigned in diversity actions in which there was no
operative state statute as a result of what later proved to be a stilted interpretation
of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). The general law met its
demise in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, in which the Court ruled that federal courts apply
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tions of the separation of powers, the comparative institutional
competencies of courts and legislatures, and our tradition of
legislative primacy in substantive lawmaking. 94 The Court also
noted that attempts to craft remedies for violations of international
law may have "adverse foreign policy consequences" or impinge "on
the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs." 95 Finally, the Court could identify no modem
Congressional mandate to engage in judicial creativity and "seek out
and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations,"
although it did note the modem passage of the TVPA and its
legislative history suggesting that the ATS should "remain intact to
permit suits based on other norms that already exist96or may ripen in
the future into rules of customary international law."
As a result of the Sosa analysis, the consideration of claims
under the ATS now involves a two-step inquiry. 97 This inquiry
begins with the threshold jurisdictional question: are the elements of
the ATS satisfied, i.e., (1) has an alien sued (2) for a tort (3)
committed in violation of the law of nations? The third part of this
analysis requires a showing that the rule in question governs the
substantive state law-both statutory and decisional- in diversity actions and that
federal judges were no longer free to "'exercise their independent judgment as to
what the law is."' 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938) (quoting Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90
F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937)). The general law was neither jurisdiction conferring
nor binding on the states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. By contrast, federal
common law stricto sensu, which has always been both jurisdiction conferring and
binding on the states pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, predated and survived
Erie. Indeed, the Erie doctrine itself is a federal common law doctrine, and on the
day Erie was decided, the Court also decided Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., which required the application of a federal common law
rule for the equitable apportionment of water. 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). Federal
common law continues to exist in several specialized or interstitial enclaves of
national or federal concern, including foreign relations. Henry Friendly, In Praise
of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405
(1964).

94. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-27 (noting the emergence of "a general
understanding that the law is not so much found or discovered as it is either made
or created" and that "a decision to create a private right of action is one better left
to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases").
95. Id. at 727-28.
96. Id. at 728 (citing 138 CONG. REc. 8071 (1992)).
97. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 266 (Katzmann, J., concurring) ("[W]hether
jurisdiction exists and whether a cause of action exists are two distinct inquiries.").
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particular type of defendant. 98 This first inquiry is resolved solely
with reference to the familiar sources of international law 99 as set
forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
0l
Justice l ° and as famously demonstrated in The Paquet Habana,'
United States v. Smith,"' and Filartiga.10 3 As a result, determining
whether the conduct alleged is a violation of international law does
not invite or require any act of judicial discretion
because the
10 4
international rule either exists or it does not exist.
By contrast, the second element of the inquiry does require
an act of judgment on the part of the court. 10 5 If jurisdiction is
proper because the alleged act constitutes a violation of international
law, the federal courts must decide whether they should recognize a
private cause of action for that violation. Although the Court
declined to adopt exhaustive criteria 106 for determining when a court

98. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20 ("A related consideration is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation
or individual."); see also id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The norm must
extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to
sue.").
99. Id. at 733 (majority opinion) (directing courts to glean "the current state
of international law, looking to those sources we have long, albeit cautiously,
recognized").
100. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
101. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
102. 18 U.S. (5Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
103. 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (canvassing international law
sources and finding a definitive prohibition against torture).
104. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 266 (2d Cir.
2007) (noting that question of whether jurisdiction exists under the ATS is
"resolved solely by reference to international law"); id. at 268 (arguing that the
district court "inappropriately injected a discretionary element into the determination of whether it had jurisdiction under the [ATS]").
105. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (noting that the
determination of whether to recognize a new cause of action "should (and, indeed,
inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences
of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts").
106. Id. at 732 ("Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of
action subject to jurisdiction under § 1350 . . . ." (emphasis added)); see In re S.
African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[T]he Sosa
decision did not deliver the definitive guidance in this area that some had come to
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should "accept[] a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under" the
ATS,' °7 the Court did rule that the ATS supported jurisdiction over a
"narrow class of international norms ... of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the eighteenth century paradigms we
have recognized." ' 0 8 In other words, norms comparable in status to
the trilogy of norms mentioned by Blackstone--rules governing safe
conducts, outlawing piracy, 0and
protecting ambassadors-are
9
actionable under the ATS today.'
In setting forth this "limit upon judicial recognition" of
actionable norms, the Court essentially ratified the test that had
developed pre-Sosa for determining actionable norms under the
ATS. 110 Under that test, courts would evaluate whether the norm in
question was sufficiently "specific, universal and obligatory" to
constitute a rule of international law and not merely an emerging rule
or aspirational lex ferenda.111 Thus, the federal courts are empowered to recognize private causes of action 1 2 for breaches of
expect."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
107. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
108. Id. at 725 (emphasis added); see also id. at 732 (cautioning the federal
courts not to allow "private claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted");
Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
116-17 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Whether an alleged norm of international law can form
the basis of an ATS claim will depend upon whether it is (1) defined with a
specificity comparable to these familiar paradigms; and (2) based upon a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world.").
109. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 (noting the courts' "residual common law
discretion" to create causes of action under federal common law to remedy the
violation of certain international law norms).
110. Id. at 731 ("The position we take today has been assumed by some
federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga.");id.
at 732 ("This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached
this Court."); id. at 747-48 (Scalia, J. concurring) (noting that the Court essentially
endorsed the reasoning of the Ninth and Second Circuits).
111. Id. at 748-49; see, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Actionable
violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory.").
112. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
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modern international law, 113 by "adapting the law of nations to
private rights" 114 and recognizing "further international norms as
judicially enforceable today." ' 1 5 The Court noted that in drafting the
ATS, Congress implicitly assumed that the "federal courts could
properly identify some international norms as enforceable in the
exercise of [the ATS]." 16 In addition to the determination of
"whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action,"
courts will also have to consider "the practical consequences of
making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts ' 1 7 as
well as other prudential concerns.
With respect to Dr. Alvarez-Machain's claims, the Court
concluded" 9 that the conduct alleged-an arrest and 12-hour period
of detention lacking authorization in any applicable law followed by
transfer to lawful authorities-violated "no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a
federal remedy."' 120 With the outcome,
human rights litigants lost the
12 1
war.
the
won
but
Sosa,
in
battle
113. Id. at 733 ("[Plaintiff's] claim must be gauged against the current state
of international law.").
114. Id. at 728.
115. Id. at 729; see also id. at 731 n.19 ("Section 1350 was enacted on the
congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining
some common law claims derived from the law of nations.").
116. Id.at730.
117. Id.at732-33.
118. Id. at 733 n.21 (noting the propriety of district courts exercising casespecific deference to the political branches).
119. The Court implies that Dr. Alvarez's claim failed both steps of the
analysis. Id. at 736 ("Alvarez cites little authority that a rule so broad has the
status of a binding customary norm today. He certainly cites nothing to justify the
federal courts in taking his broad rule as the predicate for a federal lawsuit, for its
implications would be breathtaking." (citations omitted)).
120. Id. at 738 (determining that the rule alleged by plaintiff was
aspirational and that "[c]reating a private cause of action to further that aspiration
would go beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to
exercise"); see also id. at 725 ("This requirement [that norms be "accepted by the
civilized world" and "defined with specificity"] is fatal to Alvarez's claim.").
121. See Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door is
Still Ajar"for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533,
534 (2004) ("Sosa affirmed the cautious approach adopted by most of the lower
courts and left the door open for current and future cases that address the most
egregious violations of international law.").
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Justice Breyer, in concurrence, focused on "one further
condition" for whether federal courts should recognize a new cause
of action for an international law tort: whether there is a procedural
consensus that the norm in question is subject to universal
jurisdiction. 122 He proposed that in adjudicating ATS claims, courts
should consider not only "substantive uniformity" among the legal
systems of the world in relation to the elements of a particular
offense and the identity of potential perpetrators, but also whether
there is an international "procedural agreement" as to whether such
norms are subject to extraterritorial enforcement through principles
of universal jurisdiction. 123 Under Justice Breyer's approach,
confirming that the norm in question is subject to criminal universal
jurisdiction would ensure that the extraterritorial adjudication of the
norm in the United States is consistent with principles of comity and
with the general international law rules governing the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 124 Turning to the claims in question,
Justice Breyer found no procedural agreement that the treatment
accorded to Dr. Alvarez-Machain would support the exercise of
criminal universal jurisdiction. 25 He thus concurred
that the norm's
126
appropriate.
was
case
instant
non-recognition in the

III.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST CRIMES OF

TERRORISM

The remainder of this paper applies Sosa's framework to the
phenomenon of terrorism. Most of this analysis focuses on whether
terrorism is sufficiently prohibited at the international level to
constitute a violation of the "law of nations" as required by the ATS.
At the same time, the United States has incorporated many terrorism
treaty crimes into its domestic penal code. This suggests that certain
terrorism crimes-those contained within a multilateral treaty that
the United States has domesticated-may also be actionable under
the ATS as violations of a "treaty of the United States."
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 761-62.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
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A primary hurdle to invoking the ATS in the terrorism
context remains the problem of definition.1 27 Although there have
been efforts to define terrorism under international law for decades,
an omnibus treaty or universal definition condemning terrorism in all
circumstances and in all its manifestations continues to elude the
Indeed, international instruments
international community. 2 8
condemning terrorism have at times carved out exceptions for
putatively legitimate struggles-such as those waged by national
liberation movements and groups asserting the right of selfdetermination-perpetuating the now trite adage that "one man's
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In particular, a core
group of states remains unwilling to condemn acts of violence
committed by such non-state actors against the members of the target
12 9

state's armed forces, even outside of an armed conflict situation.
These difficulties reflect doctrinal challenges in properly demarcating the domain of international humanitarian law, where certain
forms of violence are deemed privileged, as well as lingering
normative ambivalence about the utility, propriety, and legality of
resorting to violent tactics in certain political contexts. As a result of
this historically tepid international commitment to condemn all acts
of terrorism in all circumstances, codification efforts have yielded a
number of treaties that require state parties to criminalize specific

127. H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition,
26 CHITTY'S L.J. 105, 107 (1978) ("The problem of the definition of terrorism is
more than semantic. It is really a cloak for a complexity of problems, psychological, political, legalistic, and practical.").
128. Indeed, the scholarly literature is replete with competing definitions of
terrorism as well. See ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM:

A RESEARCH

GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASES, AND LITERATURE 119-52 (1983)

(cataloging over 100 definitions in the scholarly literature). Even U.S. federal law
contains different terrorism definitions for different purposes, including penal
liability, civil liability, surveillance, immigration, insurance, foreign aid, and so on.
See generally Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of
Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249-70 (2004)
(cataloging and deconstructing definitions of terrorism within U.S. federal law); id.
at 270 (noting that different definitions are appropriate for different public policy
objectives).
129. Many of these states assert reservations to this effect when they ratify
treaties that do not recognize such exceptions. See infra notes 169-173 and
accompanying text.
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terrorist acts or methods (such as hijacking or attacking
internationally protected persons), but no inclusive definition.
Notwithstanding this complex point of dissention, a survey of
existing international and domestic prohibitions against terrorism,
coupled with more modem developments toward a comprehensive
convention against terrorism, suggests that the core of a prohibition
against terrorism now exists that is sufficiently specific, identifiable,
and universal to serve as the basis for a wide range of suits under the
ATS. 130 So long as the facts fall within this core prohibition, it is of
no moment that other instances of what might be deemed terrorist
acts may remain beyond the ATS's reach. This result is bolstered
where claims involving acts of terrorism may also be framed and
pled as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocideinternational crimes for which ATS jurisdiction is already well
established.
A.

InternationalTreaty and Customary International
Law

The approach of the international community toward
terrorism has largely been to endeavor to combat it without defining
it. 131 The League of Nations embarked upon the first major attempt
in the modern era to codify the crime of terrorism under international
law after the 1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia
and others by Croatian separatists in France. The 1937 treaty-the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorismdefined terrorism as follows: "All criminal acts directed against a
State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general
public."' 32 The treaty attracted twenty-four state signatories, only

130. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) (noting that
while there may be uncertainty at the margins, the conduct alleged clearly fell
within the prohibition against piracy under international law).
131. Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 537, 539 (2004).

132. Conventionfor the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of
Nations Doe. C.546(I).M.383.1937.V (1938) [hereinafter 1937 Convention],
reprintedin M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS (1937-2001) (2001).
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one of which (India) ultimately ratified the Convention. 133 The onset
of World War II scuttled any further efforts to bring the treaty into
effect; after the134dissolution of the League of Nations, the treaty was
never revived.

From this abortive start, the international community
proceeded in a piecemeal fashion by defining and prohibiting
particular manifestations of terrorism, often in reaction to highprofile terrorist incidents.' 35 So, at the time of the Tel-Oren decision,
there were multilateral treaties addressed to the terrorist offenses of
the day: aircraft hijacking, 136 attacks on diplomats and other international personnel, 137 hostage-taking, 138 and piracy. 139 Notably, many

133. For more on the circumstances surrounding the 1937 Convention, see
Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Towards an
InternationalConvention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 69-70 (1974); Ben
Saul, The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUSTICE

78, 78-83 (2006).

134. Franck & Lockwood, supra note 133, at 70.
135. Most of these treaties have their origin in the General Assembly's Sixth
(Legal) Committee working in conjunction with the Security Council, the
Economic and Social Council, and certain Specialized Agencies (such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization).
136. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860
U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Hijacking Convention]; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Hijacking Convention].
The international community subsequently promulgated a Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-19, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474
[hereinafter Airports Protocol].
137. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Protected Persons
Convention]. This treaty was later joined by the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel, done Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 391
[hereinafter United Nations Convention]. The Organization of American States
also promulgated a regional treaty on this front. Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crime Against Persons and Related
Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1438
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter OAS Convention].
138. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages Convention].
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of these early treaties were not denominated as terrorism treaties per
se; rather, they prohibit certain conduct without reference to any
terrorist objective, motive, or purpose.
Since the D.C. Circuit rendered the Tel-Oren decision in
1984, however, the phenomenon of terrorism and efforts to prohibit
it have gained significantly greater prominence in international law.
This trajectory predated, but was expedited by, the attacks of
September 11 th. In particular, the international community, through
multiple branches of the United Nations, has promulgated a number
of instruments condemning particular instances and types of
terrorism and recognizing various manifestations of terrorism as
international crimes. Some early instruments reflected ambivalence
about the legitimacy of certain violent acts in particular political
contexts. Over time, however, articulated justifications for acts that
might constitute terrorism have been gradually abandoned, giving
rise to a purer and less politicized international prohibition.
By way of examples from the United Nations' political
branches, the General Assembly issued its Basic Principles of the
Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and
Alien Domination and Racist Regimes in 1973, which declared that
"[t]he struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination and
racist regimes for the implementation of their right to selfdetermination and independence is legitimate and in full accordance
with principles of international law."' 140 Even as late as 1991, a
General Assembly Resolution denounced terrorism, but in virtually
the same breath, reaffirmed "the right to self-determination, freedom
and independence ... of peoples forcibly deprived of that right ...
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms
of alien domination, or the right of these peoples to struggle
139.

Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450

U.N.T.S. 11. This treaty was later replaced by the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the third such treaty setting forth rules governing the oceans.
140. G.A. Res. 3103, 1, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (Dec. 12, 1973); see also G.A. Res. 3314, annex arts. 3, 7, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) (defining

"aggression," but noting that nothing in the definition of aggression "could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence ... of
peoples forcibly deprived of that right ... particularly peoples under colonial and

racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end...").
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legitimately to this end and to seek and receive support in
accordance with the principles of the Charter."' 14 1 Several years
later, however, the General Assembly signaled a shift in its collective
thinking in its approval of a Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism. 142 The Declaration more clearly stated that
criminal acts "intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in
the general public ... for political purposes are in any circumstance
unjustifiable," regardless of any ideological or other causes that may
be invoked to justify them.1 43 The Declaration further required
Member States to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or
participating in terrorist acts in territories of other States or
acquiescing in or encouraging activities within
their own territories
44
1
acts.
such
of
commission
directed towards the
It was not until 1992 and in response to the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 that the Security Council officially declared terrorism
to be a threat to international peace and security. 145 Building on this
resolution, Security Council Resolution 1373, issued pursuant to
Chapter VII in the weeks following the attacks of September 11th,
among other things obliged all states of the world to criminalize,
prohibit, and prevent various aspects of the financing or sponsorship
of terrorism, effectively rendering select provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of

141. G.A. Res. 46/51, 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (Dec. 9, 1991).
142. G.A. Res. 49/60, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Feb. 17, 1995). The
General Assembly reaffirmed this Declaration in Resolution 51/210. U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996).
143. G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 142, 3.

144. Id. 5. These ideals were reaffirmed in the United Nations World
Summit, a high-level summit of the 60th General Assembly, wherein states
"strongly [condemned] terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by
whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most
serious threats to international peace and security." World Summit Outcome, G.A.
Res. 60/1, 81, U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
145. See S.C. Res. 731, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992)
(recognizing "the right of all States ...

to protect their nationals from acts of

international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security").
Prior Security Council resolutions had addressed terrorism, see, e.g., S.C. Res.
635, U.N. Doc. S/RES/635 (June 14, 1989) (concerning the safety of civil aviation
and the problem of undetectable explosives), but Resolution 731 squarely placed
terrorism on the Council's Chapter VII agenda.
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1 47
binding on all United Nations member states.

Notwithstanding this dedicated resolution, the Council did not define
terrorism, leaving it up to states to implement those obligations
based upon their own understanding of the concept. The Resolution
also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee, whose directorate
monitors state compliance with the anti-terrorism framework and
encourages countries to adjust their domestic law as necessary.' 48
Subsequently, Council Resolution 1566, issued after the 2004
bombings in Madrid and the attack on a school in Russia,
condemned the following:
[C]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a
group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
149
act ....
This language reads like a definition of terrorism, but the
Council did not explicitly identify this provision as such, and this
language was followed by a clause indicating that such acts
"constitute offenses within the scope of and as defined in the
146. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S.TREATY Doc. No. 106-49, 39 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter

Financing Convention].
147. The Resolution also called upon states to ratify the "relevant
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9
December 1999," effectively adopting the provisions of those treaties. S.C. Res.
1373, 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). Controversially, Resolution
1373 made no reference to international human rights. This was later remedied in
part by Resolution 1456, which declared that "States must ensure that any measure
taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international
law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in
particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law." S.C. Res.
1456, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003).
148. Counter-Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/ (last visited
Nov. 06, 2008).
149. S.C. Res. 1566, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
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'5
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism." 1 0
Resolution 1566 also contemplates an international compensation
fund for victims of terrorist acts that would be financed through
voluntary state contributions and assets seized from terrorist
groups.151 Subsequently, Resolution 1624 (2005) obliged states to
prohibit "incitement to commit a terrorist act," 152 and Resolution
1822 (2008) expanded the list of targeted individuals and entities
beyond al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban to include
"other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with
them."' 53
In 2003, then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan convened
a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to "assess
current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate how
our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those
threats; and to make recommendations for strengthening the United
Nations so that it can provide collective security for all in the twentyfirst century.' ' 154 The Report focused on terrorism as one such threat
and stressed the need to identify and eliminate root causes, counter
extremism and intolerance, develop collective counter-terrorism
methods, build state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and
operations, and control dangerous materials, all without sacrificing
important human rights and rule of law values. 5 5 The Report also
called upon the international community to develop a comprehensive
definition of terrorism within a comprehensive convention.156 This

150. Id. The Council simply "recalls" that such acts constitute offenses
within international treaties relating to terrorism and are under no circumstances
justifiable. States are called on to prevent such acts and ensure that they are appropriately punished. Id.
151. Id. I 10.
152. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
153. S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008). These
Resolutions have given rise to criticism for encouraging states to adopt aggressive
counter-terrorism mechanisms in the penal and non-penal contexts (e.g., with
regard to surveillance) without ensuring respect for human rights. See Kim Lane
Scheppele, The International State of Emergency: Challenges to Constitutionalism
after September 11 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
154. The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General, 3, delivered to
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
155. Id. T 148.
156. Id. TT 157-59. See also World Summit Outcome, supra note 144, 83.
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definition, the Panel urged, should consolidate existing counterterrorism instruments and describe terrorism as:
"[A]ny action, in addition to actions already specified
by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism,
the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants,
when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international
organization to do or
'1 5 7
act."
any
doing
from
to abstain
The Panel argued that the lack of a comprehensive definition
"prevents the United Nations from exerting its moral authority and
from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism 15
is 8never an
causes."
of
defensible
most
the
for
even
tactic,
acceptable
On the treaty front, a number of additional manifestations of
terrorism are now recognized as criminal, including attacks on
maritime navigation 159 and fixed platforms on the continental
shelf,160 acts of nuclear terrorism, 16 1 terrorist bombings, 162 terrorist
157. Id. 164(d).
158. Id. 157.
159. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, done Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-1, 1678
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Maritime Navigation Convention]. This treaty was
drafted in response to the 1985 seizure of the Italian vessel Achille Lauro.
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in
Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated, 937
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
160. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter Fixed Platforms Protocol]. This
Protocol is open to signatories to the Maritime Navigation Convention, supra note
159.
161. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, openedfor signature Sept. 14, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 815 [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention].
162. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
Jan. 12, 1998, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 [hereinafter
Bombing Convention]. The international community promulgated this treaty in
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financing, 163 and the development or use of biological or chemical
weapons of mass destruction. 164 Many of these multilateral treaties
are well-subscribed to, indicating a high degree of acceptance within
they contain and the
the international community of the prohibitions
65
enforcement mechanisms they mandate.'
When considered collectively, these piecemeal treaties in
many respects come close to covering the field. In particular, the
1999 Terrorist Financing Convention serves in certain respects as a
unifying instrument for these various treaties by incorporating a
number of extant treaties by reference in its annex. Specifically,
Article 2(1) provides that:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning
of this Convention if that person by any means,
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they
should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [any
violation of an annexed treaty].166

response to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. A
predecessor treaty requires the marking for the purpose of detection of plastic
explosives. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359
[hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention].
163. Financing Convention, supra note 146. This Convention attracted very
few members until the attacks of September 11th and the issuance of the Security
Council of Resolution 1373. See supra note 147.
164. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, openedfor
signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Chemical Weapons Convention]. This treaty built upon a related treaty dealing
with Biological Weapons. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter
Bacteriological Weapons Convention].
165. The status of these terrorism treaties is compiled here, as of January
2008: Extract from the Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism (Jan. 17, 2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/terrorism
/terrorismtableupdate Jan 2008.pdf.
166. Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 2(1).
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The treaty then comes close to an omnibus definition when it
additionally calls for the domestic criminalization of the financing
of:
Any other act intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a government or an international
organization
167
to do or to abstain from doing any act.
These treaties reject all political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, and religious grounds that may be advanced to excuse
or justify the commission of prohibited acts.168 Nonetheless, certain
states continue to make reservations to these treaties that exempt the
treaties' application in situations in which groups are exercising
rights of self-determination. For example, in connection with its
ratification of the Bombing Convention, Pakistan submitted a
declaration stating that "nothing in this Convention shall be applicable to struggles, including armed struggles, for the realization of
[the] right of self-determination launched against any alien or foreign
occupation or domination, in accordance with the rules of interna167. Id. art. 2(1)(b); see also Council Framework Decision 475/2002, on
Combating Terrorism, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 164) 3, 4 (EU) [hereinafter EU
Framework Decision] (prohibiting "(a) attacks upon a person's life which may
cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or
hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public
facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information
system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private
property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) seizure
of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) manufacture,
possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development
of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or
causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
and (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other
fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life").
168. See, e.g., Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 5 (requiring
parties to adopt necessary measures, including domestic legislation, to prevent use
of such justifications).
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tional law."' 169 Egypt, Jordan, and the Syrian Arab Republic made
similar declarations with respect to the Financing Convention. 70 For
example, Egypt included the following statement upon ratification of
the treaty: "[w]ithout prejudice to the principles and norms of
general international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Arab Republic of Egypt does not consider acts of national
resistance in all its forms, including armed resistance against foreign
occupation and aggression with a view to liberation and selfdetermination, as terrorist acts within the meaning of ... the

Convention."' 17' These reservations reflect language contained in the
League of Arab State's Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, 172 which provides at Article 2(1) that:
Any act committed in a situation of a struggle by any
means, including the armed struggle against foreign
occupation and aggression, for liberation and self169. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, http://treaties.un.org/Pages
Many states
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=372&chapter' 18&lang=en.
objected to this reservation. Id.
170. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, http://treaties.un.org
A num/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=374&chapter=18&lang=en.
ber of states also lodged objections to these declarations as contrary to Article 6,
which obliges parties to "ensure that criminal acts within the scope of [the]
Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature." Id.
171. Id.
172. Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, April 22, 1998,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra

note 132, at 393 [hereinafter Arab League Convention]. The Convention defines
terrorism as:
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes,
that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal
agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming
them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to
cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or
property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize
national resources.
Id. art. 1.1. The Arab League Convention also incorporated by reference other
terrorism treaties. Id. art. 1.2.
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determination, according to the principles of international law is not to be considered a crime. Those acts
taken in defense of the soil unity1 of
any Arab state are
73
also not to be considered crimes.'
Alongside this sectoral approach to terrorism, the United
Nations has endeavored to develop a comprehensive definition of
terrorism through an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism
first convened in the 1970s.1 74 This effort, however, became mired
in Cold War politics and polemics. In 1996, pursuant to a proposal
from India,17 the international community renewed this movement
by constituting another Ad Hoc Committee to draft additional
terrorism treaties, including a comprehensive treaty premised on a
criminal law framework. 17' The General Assembly's Sixth (Legal)
Committee transformed the work of the Ad Hoc Committee into a
consolidated draft treaty, which defines the applicable offense as
follows:

173. Id. art. 2(a).
174. See G.A. Res. 3034 9, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/8730 (Dec. 18, 1972) (establishing Committee).
175. The Permanent Representative of India, Letter Dated 1 November 1996
from the Permanent Representative of India to United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/6
(Nov. 11, 1996). India later submitted a draft comprehensive convention which
served as the starting point for multilateral negotiations. Draft Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism: Working Document Submitted by India,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (Aug. 28, 2000), availableat http://www.indianembassy.org
/policy/terrorism/draft-convention.htm.
176. See G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 142, 9 (establishing an Ad Hoc
Committee to draft terrorism treaties, including eventually a comprehensive
treaty); see also G.A. Res. 61/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/40 (Dec. 4, 2006)
(discussing measures to eliminate international terrorism). The Committee drafted
three topical treaties: the Bombing Convention, supra note 162, G.A. Res. 52/164,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/52/64 (Dec. 15, 1997), the Financing Convention, supra note
146, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), and the Nuclear
Terrorism Convention, supra note 161, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/290 (April 13, 2005). With Resolution 54/110, the Committee along
with a working group of the General Assembly's Legal Committee began to focus
on a comprehensive convention. G.A. Res. 54/110, 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54
/110 (Dec. 9, 1999).
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Any person commits an offence within the meaning
of the present Convention if that person, by any
means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a)
Death or serious bodily injury; or
(b)
Serious damage to public or private property,
including a place of public use, a State or government
facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or
(c)
Damage to [such] property, places, facilities or
systems . . . resulting in or likely to result in major

economic loss when the purpose of the conduct, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a Government or an international
organization
177
act.
any
doing
from
abstain
to do or to
The current language envisions that if a sectoral treaty and the
Comprehensive Convention
are both applicable, the terms of the
178
prevail.
would
former
Negotiations on this effort have stalled because delegates
have been unable to agree on the scope of the Convention vis-A-vis
international humanitarian law (i.e., the law of war) and whether the
treaty would address state terrorism.1 79 As discussed more fully
below, 180 these two stumbling blocks are interrelated. In particular,
delegates have struggled with determining when national liberation
and self-determination movements have the right to use force
without risking condemnation and prosecution for committing
terrorism. 181 In addition, some delegates have favored excluding
177. See Chairman of the Sixth Committee, Letter Dated 3 August 2005
from the Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the President of the General
Assembly, app. 1I, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doe. A/59/894, (Aug.
12, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Comprehensive Convention] (conveying consolidated
text).
178. Id. app. 1I, art. 3.
179. Id. app. I, at 5 (reproducing Jordanian proposal to this effect).
180. See infra Part II.C.2.
181. See generally Mahmoud Hmoud, Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism: Major Bones of Contention, 4 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1031 (2006) (discussing the various issues that have proven problematic in defining the crime of terrorism); Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies, Draft
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (August 11, 2006),
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situations covered by international humanitarian law from the treaty
altogether, while others want any attack against civilians or other
protected persons to fall within the terrorism framework, even if
committed within
an armed conflict when humanitarian law would
82
also apply.'
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/intlterr.pdf (illustrating a draft of the
compromise).
182. While a universal comprehensive treaty remains in the works, a number
of regional organizations have promulgated treaties prohibiting terrorism. E.g.,
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, July 14, 1999,
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE
PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM at 210, U.N. Sales
No. E.03.V.9 (2004), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/oau
_e.pdf [hereinafter OAU Convention]; Convention of the Organisation of the
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, adopted July 1, 1999,
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, supra, at 188, available at http://www.oic-oic.org
/oicnew/english/convention/terrorismconvention.htm [hereinafter OIC Convention]; Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999, reprinted in UNITED
NATIONS, supra, at 175, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/csi
_e.pdf; Arab League Convention, supra note 172; SAARC Regional Convention
on Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 4, 1987, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, supra,
at 153, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv 18.pdf (primarily governing extradition for treaty-based terrorism crimes); European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter
European Convention] (also addressed to extradition); Council of Europe
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, Europ. T.S. No. 196,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/196.htm [hereinafter Council of Europe Convention] (defining terrorism with reference to existing
sectoral treaties); OAS Convention, supra note 137; Inter-American Convention
Against Terrorism, June 3, 2002, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-18, 42 I.L.M. 19
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention] (defining terrorism with reference to
existing sectoral treaties). By way of example, the OAU Convention defines
terrorism as:
[A]ny act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and
which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause
serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or
causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural
resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended
to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body,
institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain
from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to
act according to certain principles; or
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Similar concerns led to the exclusion of terrorism crimes
from the statute of the International Criminal Court. The developments toward a greater recognition and articulation of both the
illegitimacy and illegality of acts of terrorism largely post-dated the
promulgation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC),' 8 3 which was finalized in 1998.18 4

The lack of a

consensus definition for the crime of terrorism was one of the
primary reasons that drafters excluded terrorism from the ICC's
jurisdiction.' 85 Early drafts of the Statute, however, did contemplate
some jurisdiction over terrorism crimes. As originally conceived,
the ICC's constitutive statute was to be primarily procedural in
nature, incorporating by reference the "core" international crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined by
customary international law (CIL) along with certain "treaty crimes"
set forth in discrete multilateral treaties, such as those addressing
terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and the like. 186 To
that end, nine of the terrorism treaties referenced above (e.g., those
addressing terrorism against aircraft, ships, hostages, and diplomats)
were included in an annex to the original statute. 187
Early on in the negotiations, delegates expressed concern that
customary international law would not define the relevant ICC
crimes as clearly as would be necessary to provide adequate notice to

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the

public or to create a public emergency; or
(iii) create general insurrection in a State.
OAU Convention, supra, art. 1.3.
183. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
184. The ICC Statute in some respects engaged in the progressive development of the law; in other respects, it did not codify all existing law. See id. art. 10
("Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way
existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this
Statute.").
185. Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal
Court: Possibilitiesand Problems, 34 RUTGERSL.J. 1, 18 (2002).
186. Id. at 17.
187. Id.
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188
an accused pursuant to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
In addition, with respect to treaty crimes, delegates anticipated that it
would be necessary to confirm that the treaty was in force with
respect to the relevant states (e.g., the territorial and nationality state)
for a prosecution to proceed. These concerns led states to agree to
set out the definitions of all the crimes in the Statute (and later adopt
Elements of Crimes) rather than incorporate such crimes by
reference to pre-existing treaties or CIL. Accordingly, a consolidated text of the ICC Statute included a more universal definition of
terrorism, which was reminiscent of the 1937 Convention and
defined the crime as:

Undertaking, organizing, sponsoring, ordering, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts of
violence against another State directed at persons or
property and of such a nature as to create terror, fear
or insecurity in the minds of public figures, groups of
persons, or the general public or populations, for
whatever considerations and purposes of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
such other nature that may be invoked to justify
89
them. 1
As the negotiations proceeded at the 1998 Rome Conference,
the treaty crimes eventually either fell out of the Statute, as was the
case with terrorism stricto sensu and drug trafficking, or were
incorporated into the core crimes, as was the case with respect to
crimes against internationally protected persons (which are
enumerated as war crimes at Article 8(2)(b)(iii)) and apartheid
(which is listed as a crime against humanity at Article 7(l)(j)). 19 °
With respect to the crime of terrorism, drafters articulated several
reasons for eventually excluding the crime from the Statute
188. Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court,
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 57, U.N. Doc. A/50/22(SUPP) (Sept. 6, 1995).
189. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, Report
of the Preparatory Committee of the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998).
190. Martinez, supra note 185, at 17-19, 33, 37.
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altogether: (1) terrorism has no universally accepted definition; (2)
terrorism was not considered to be one of "the most serious crimes of
international concern" as contemplated by Article 1 of the ICC
Statute; (3) at the time, terrorism was not clearly recognized as a
crime under customary international law; (4) including crimes of
terrorism would unnecessarily politicize the ICC; and (5) there are
alternative venues for terrorism prosecutions such that establishing
international jurisdiction would be unnecessary or duplicative. 91 In
addition, delegates were committed to concluding the treaty in five
weeks, and the inclusion1 92of terrorism was proving to be a sticking
point in the negotiations.
With respect to the politicization argument, states contended
that the inclusion of terrorism would impede ratifications of the
Rome Statute for fear of politicized prosecutions and proceedings,
especially in cases in which states are battling subversive groups or
internal rebellions.1 93 As one scholar has noted, terrorism "is not
only a phenomenon, it is also an invective, and there are many
examples of States using this invective in a most subjective manner
to de-legitimize
and demonize political opponents, associations or
'1 94
other States."

Terrorism was also excluded under the rationale that effective
systems of national and international cooperation are already in place
for the prosecution of terrorism crimes. Because governments are
usually the direct or indirect target of terrorist acts, states are highly

191. Id. at 18; see Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 31 (1999) (discussing lack of

consensus among states in defining crimes of terrorism); Benjamin B. Ferencz,
Blaine Sloan Lecture: InternationalCriminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg,
10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203 (1998) (discussing the historical development of

international law and terrorism).
192.

Arsanjani, supra note 191, at 29.

193. Christian Much, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and
Terrorism as an InternationalCrime, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 121, 126 (2006).
194. Id. at 133. This argument of course overlooks the fact that many of the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have significant political ramifications,
not the least of which is the as yet undefined crime of aggression. See Richard
John Galvin, The ICC Prosecutor, CollateralDamage, and NGOs: Evaluatingthe
Risk of a Politicized Prosecution, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(exploring the prospect of a politicized prosecution in the ICC directed against the
U.S. military).
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95
motivated to prosecute acts of terrorism through criminal actions'
or to encourage the pursuit of civil actions by victims.1 96 Indeed, as
compared to the so-called "atrocity crimes," terrorism crimes are
more often incorporated into domestic penal codes and are more
frequently prosecuted by states.1 97 Given this, it was argued, the
principle of complementarity will likely prevent the prosecution of
acts of terrorism before the ICC in many cases.' 98 Moreover,
effective counter-terrorism measures require "long-term planning,
infiltration into the organizations involved, the necessity of giving
immunity to some individuals involved, and so forth" 199-all
functions more effectively exercised by national jurisdictions than an
international court far from the events in question and the relevant
political milieu.

195. In the United States, for example, Omar Rahman, the so-called "blind
sheikh," was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the first attempted bombings
of the World Trade Center in 1993. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111
(2d Cir. 1999). Zacarias Moussaoui, once considered the twentieth hijacker for the
September 11th attacks, was sentenced in the U.S. for his role in the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 1:01CR00455-001 (E.D. Va. May 4,
2006), available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/library/moussaoui/I 01-cr00455/docs/72444/0.pdf. Most recently, Jose Padilla was convicted of conspiring
to murder, kidnap, and maim persons in another country. United States v.
Hassoun, No. 0:04CR60001 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2007); see Abby Goodnough &
Scott Shane, Padilla is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2007, at Al.
196. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. See generally William
P. Hoye, FightingFire with ... Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on State
Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 105 (2002) (addressing civil
lawsuits in domestic courts as a means of providing remedies for victims of statesponsored terrorist attacks).
197. The United States has codified a number of terrorism crimes at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2331-2332 (2006).
198. ICC Statute, supra note 183, art. 17. The principle of complementarity
is fundamental to the ICC framework and provides that the Court will exercise
jurisdiction only where the relevant domestic authorities (e.g., the territorial and
nationality states) are either unwilling or unable to prosecute offenders. Notably,
complementarity is not triggered, at least according to the plain text of Article 17,
where the domestic courts are overly zealous about terrorism prosecutions or
where the defendant's due process rights are potentially in jeopardy-two risks for
terrorism prosecutions where the state is the target of the acts in question. See
Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17
of the Rome Statute on NationalDue Process, 17 CRiM. L.F. 255, 261 (2006).
199. Arsanjani, supra note 191, at 29.
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Principal supporters of including terrorism in the ICC Statute
were Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey-all states facing serious
internal terrorist threats. During the drafting of the Rome Statute,
states advocating the inclusion of the various treaty crimes formed an
alliance that reflected substantive overlap (in narco-terrorism) as
well as the recognition that it would be an uphill battle to include
crimes other than the core international crimes in the Statute. 20 0 At
one point, this alliance (consisting of states as varied as Barbados
and India) argued for a "compromise" that would list the treaty
crimes in Article 5 and then leave their definition to another day, as
was the approach taken with respect to the crime of aggression. 201
An alternative proposal advocated for the inclusion of terrorism as an
enumerated crime against humanity rather than as a standalone
crime. 202 Much opposition to the inclusion of treaty crimes came
from NGO participants, who feared that these crimes would distract
20 3
and overwhelm the Court at the expense of the atrocity crimes.
In the end, most of the treaty crimes were excised or limited,
and the final Statute asserts jurisdiction over only four core crimesgenocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression, with the latter remaining without a definition. 2 4 Some
drafters remained uneasy with this result and managed to promulgate
Resolution E at the Rome Conference, which recommended that a
review conference to be assembled in 2010 consider the inclusion of
the crime of terrorism. 20 5 As this Conference approaches, many
states and scholars continue to argue that terrorism should be
included within the Court's jurisdiction.206 In particular, these
200. Philippe Kirsh & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an
InternationalCriminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 4
(1999).
201.
202.

Martinez, supra note 185, at 19.
Id. at 18-19.

203. See id. at 18 (listing reasons the Court does not address treaty crimes).
204. Id. at 18-19.
205. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, FinalAct of the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Establishment
of an InternationalCriminal Court, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17,
1998).

206. See, e.g., Roy S. Lee, How the World Will Relate to the Court: An
Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750 (2002) (arguing that
terrorist attacks can and should be includable under the ICC's jurisdiction).
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advocates question the assumption made during the Rome
Conference-which occurred in 1998, prior to the attacks of
September 11, 2001-that terrorism is not a serious crime of
international concern. They argue that terrorism represents a
substantial and growing threat, 2 07 especially given the possibility of
attacks with20 8 nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass
destruction.
Only one ad hoc tribunal will assert jurisdiction over
terrorism stricto sensu: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
The STL is a hybrid tribunal established by the United Nations and
Lebanon to investigate and prosecute those "responsible for the
terrorist crime which killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri and others." 20 9 The Tribunal has a mandate to apply the
laws of Lebanon "relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts
of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity,
illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences,
including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime,
Article 314 of the
criminal participation and conspiracy., 210
Lebanese Penal Code (LPC), one of several terrorism-related
provisions that may be litigated before the STL, "defines 'terrorist
207.

CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CONGRESS

ON THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, 1 JULY THROUGH 30

DECEMBER 2003, at 7 (2004) ("[T]he threat of terrorists using chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials remains high."); see also Seth
Brugger, International Law, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Finding and Fillingthe Gaps, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 803, 807 (2005) (.'[T]here is a
serious and growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical,
biological and other potentially deadly materials"' (quoting S.C. Res. 1456, supra
note 147).
208. See S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 147 ("[T]here is a serious and growing
danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other
potentially deadly materials."). A U.N. Committee determined that acts of
terrorism increased in number in the post-September 11 period. See Ad Hoc
Comm. Established by Gen. Assembly Resolution 51/210, Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December
1996, 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/62/37(Supp) (Feb. 5, 6 & 15, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Ad
Hoc Committee Report] (condemning terrorism and calling for further state action
to combat its spread).
209. Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon pmbl., May 30, 2007, 46
I.L.M. 999.
210. Id. art. 2.
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acts' as all 'acts designed to create a state of alarm which are
committed by means such as explosive devices, inflammable materials, poisonous or incendiary products or infectious or microbial
agents likely to create a public hazard.' ' '2 11 The mens rea requires

knowledge and a will to commit the terrorist act along with a specific
intent to create a state of alarm or fear. 212 The STL is thus a quasiinternational tribunal effectively specializing in the law of terrorism.
As such, its jurisprudence may be persuasive as other tribunals
consider terrorism crimes in the future.
Many of the sectoral terrorism treaties direct state parties to
enact domestic legislation to enable cooperation in the investigation,
extradition, and prosecution of individuals and groups involved in
acts of terrorism. The United States has been quite diligent in
ratifying and implementing these terrorism treaties. Title 18 contains
a constellation of terrorism crimes that may be prosecuted at the
213
federal level pursuant to extraterritorial principles of jurisdiction.
Many of these federal crimes implement multilateral treaty offenses
contained in treaties to which the United States is a party. 214 For
example, on the date the Terrorist Bombing Convention entered into
force with respect to the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2332(f) came
into effect to provide for criminal penalties for violations of the
treaty. 2 15 By contrast, other terrorism or terrorism-like offenses are
unique to U.S. law. The provision of various forms of material
support to acts of terrorism constitutes a federal crime, but only some
prohibited actions would also trigger liability under the Financing

211. Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1129 (2007) (emphasis
omitted).
212. Id. at 1133.
213. Key provisions were enacted by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and the
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), among other
pieces of legislation.
214. See also 18 U.S.C. § 37 (2006) (implementing the Airports Protocol,
supra note 136); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (implementing the Hostages Convention, supra
note 138); 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (implementing the Maritime Navigation Convention,
supra note 159); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (prohibiting the financing of any act that
constitutes a violation of a number of terrorism treaties).
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332(f) (providing for penalties for unlawfully
delivering, placing, discharging, or detonating an explosive in a public place).
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Convention. 2 16 In addition, the U.S. has a number of code provisions
criminalizing various forms of attack against U.S. citizens or
personnel within the United States that do not find expression in any

penal terrorism treaty, including acts of murder, assault, 217 or attacks
with weapons of mass destruction.21 8
216. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 directs the President to designate
organizations that "engage in terrorist activity" as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B) as "foreign terrorist organizations." This designation is a condition precedent for applicability of the material support statutes, which penalizes the
provision of material support to such organizations. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
"Terrorist activities" include sabotaging or hijacking a vessel, aircraft or vehicle;
detaining a person and threatening to kill, injure or further detain that person in
order to compel a third person to do something; violently attacking an internationally protected person; assassinating any person; using a biological agent, chemical
agent, nuclear device, explosive, or firearm with intent to endanger the safety or
one or more persons or to cause substantial damage to property; or threatening,
attempting or conspiring to do any of these things. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(2006). "Engage in terrorist activity" also includes providing material support to
terrorists, such as the preparation and planning of a terrorist activity; gathering of
information on potential targets for terrorist activity; providing a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, false documentation or identification,
weapons, explosives, or training to any individual the actor knows or has reason to
believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; soliciting funds or
other things of value for any terrorist organization; or soliciting any individual for
membership in a terrorist organization or to engage in terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2332. This provision is not defined directly as a terrorist
offense. It prohibits the killing of a U.S. national while such national is outside the
United States, the extraterritorial participation in a conspiracy or attempt to kill a
U.S. national, and the extraterritorial commission of physical violence against a
U.S. national. Id. § 2332(a)-(c). No prosecution may be commenced, however,
without the written certification from the Attorney General's office that the
"offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a
civilian population." Id. § 2332(d). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b prohibits the
killing, maiming, kidnapping, or assault of any person within the United States
when the conduct in question transcends national boundaries.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. Reflecting the active and passive personality
theories of jurisdiction, this provision prohibits the use, or threat or conspiracy to
use, weapons of mass destruction by or against a U.S. national under various
territorial and extraterritorial circumstances. Id. § 2332a(a)-(b). Weapons of mass
destruction are defined as weapons "designed or intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals, or their precursors," weapons that involve "a biological agent, toxin, or
vector," weapons that are "designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life," or other destructive devices (such as bombs, grenades,
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Consensus Elements of Terrorism

Although this collection of pronouncements, treaties, and
soft-law instruments emerging from the United Nations, regional
political bodies, and international judicial institutions contain some
definitional variations, most modem formulations of terrorism
crimes share certain basic structural elements 21 9 that could serve as
the basis of a generalized tort of terrorism under the ATS. These are
as follows: (1) terrorism involves the intentional perpetration by
non-state, sub-state or, at times, state actors of various forms of
violence (2) that targets innocent civilians or civilian infrastructure
or, potentially, members of the military not engaged in active combat
(3) for the purpose of causing fear or terror, or of coercing or
intimidating a government or population (4) in order to achieve some
political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious goal. Most penal
instruments also include an internationalizing jurisdictional element
that distinguishes prohibited acts of international terrorism from
violent acts that implicate only domestic law and permits, and in
some cases mandates, the exercise of expansive forms of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
1.

The Objective Element: Violent Acts
Otherwise Criminal

Terrorism, like other international crimes (e.g., crimes
against humanity or war crimes), is an umbrella crime that encompasses a number of constitutive criminal acts. All definitions of
terrorism contain an enumerated set of violent acts (or the threat
thereof) whose territorial commission would normally be penalized
under domestic law (assault, torture, murder, mayhem, arson,

rockets, missiles, or mines). Id. § 2332a(c). No terrorist motive need be shown.
There is no exception for acts of war, but the provision criminalizes only conduct
committed "without lawful authority," which would likely exclude the use of such
weapons by privileged belligerents. Id. § 2332a(a).

219. See Norberg, supra note 2, at 209 (identifying common elements of
international, regional, and domestic definitions); Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic
Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism,9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357, 361

(2003) (collecting and deconstructing multiple legal and sociological definitions of
terrorism).
HeinOnline -- 28 Rev. Litig. 429 2008-2009

430

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 28:2

etc.). 220 In addition, the Financing Convention 22 1 and some domestic
statutes 222 also prohibit preparatory or otherwise non-violent actions
that become criminal when they are connected to the commission of
one or more terrorist acts. In general, these acts may be committed
against either private persons or state actors. To be sure, the
promulgation of a multilateral treaty does not automatically generate
a customary international law prohibition. 223 Indeed, the terrorism
treaties are primarily concerned with creating a common regime to
encourage and facilitate multilateral cooperation in repressing
particular means and methods of terrorism through the provision of
mutual assistance, enabling the extradition of offenders, the prosecution of offenders wherever they may be found, the recognition of
foreign judgments, and the seizure and forfeiture of assets. 224 That
said, as discussed above, there is a high degree of congruence
between the prohibitions contained within these treaties and authoritative pronouncements by the United Nations' political bodies.
Indeed, the Security Council has ratified many of the terrorism
prohibitions while acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
essentially rendering these prohibitions binding on all U.N.
members. In addition, the high degree of treaty ratification and
subsequent domestic codifications and adjudications of terrorism
prohibitions by state parties signal state acceptance of the norms in
question.
Many acts of terrorism also implicate other aspects of
international criminal law. Given the normative redundancy and
intersectionality in international criminal law, it is possible to situate
acts of terrorism in other international crimes. Given the frequent
overlap between situations in which international humanitarian law
(IHL), a.k.a. the law of armed conflict or the law of war, is
applicable and situations in which acts of terrorism may occur, many
220. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331(a)(A) (2006) (defining terrorism as
involving "violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State").
221. Supra note 146.
222. See discussion supra note 38 on the U.S. material support statutes.
223. See Antonio Cassese, The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism
in InternationalLaw, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 933, 935 (2006) (finding a customary

rule prohibiting international terrorism).
224.

Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 2(2)-(3).
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acts of terrorism committed within armed conflicts may also
constitute war crimes, so long as there is a nexus between the act and
the armed conflict. 22 5 The conventional war crimes are found in the
grave breaches regimes of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I,
which prohibit certain acts when committed against persons
protected by those conventions, namely civilians and prisoners of
war.226 Many of these crimes involve the same conduct that often
constitute acts of terrorism, such as willful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, unlawful confinement, the taking of hostages, and
the extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Under classic treaty IHL, these acts only constitute war crimes when
committed within the context of an international armed conflict.227
The ad hoc international criminal tribunals 228 have consistently
225. See In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1287-89 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (rejecting plaintiffs' war crimes claims where plaintiffs failed to allege a
state of armed conflict); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (recognizing customary international law war crime
of attacking civilians based on the Geneva Conventions and their incorporation
into U.S. law); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1139-40 (C.D. Cal.
2002) ("Courts have held that a violation of the law of war may serve as a basis for
a claim under the [ATS]."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 487 F.3d
1193 (9th Cir.), and reh 'g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). But see
Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
119-20 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding inadequate support in the law for plaintiffs' claims
that the deployment of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War violated customary
international law prohibitions against the use of poisoned weapons and the
infliction of unnecessary suffering on grounds that Agent Orange was used as a
defoliant and not as an intentional poison to target human populations).
226. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW
Convention]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
art. 1(3), (4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
227. See Protocol I, supra note 226, art. 1 (limiting application of the
Protocol to international conflicts and excluding situations of disturbances and
strife); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (same).
228. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 83 (Oct. 2, 1995) (announcing
framework for adjudicating war crimes in non-international armed conflicts).
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identified and adjudicated parallel customary international law
prohibitions within non-international armed conflicts. 229 In addition
to the treaties' enumerated grave breaches, there is a rich customary
international law 230 of war crimes that includes prohibitions drawn

from the Hague-law wing of IHL. 23 1 These include the crimes of
intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects,
utilizing force disproportionate to any military advantage gained,
attacking undefended towns or buildings, attacks against cultural
property, using treachery to kill or wound, employing poisonous or
asphyxiating weapons or weapons that are calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering, etc.232
Most relevant in the terrorism context, the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals have identified the crime of
"terrorizing civilians" as a war crime within the uncodified laws and
customs of war. 233 In Galic, the Prosecutor so charged the defendants according to Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol 1234 and

229. But see Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., No. 04-20225-CIVSEITZ/MCALILEY, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92778, at *30-31 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22,
2006) (questioning whether violations of common Article 3 satisfy the Sosa test).
230. E.g., JEAN-MAERI HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 574-767 (2005).
231. Hague law derives from a series of conventions concluded in the Hague
in 1899 and 1907 that aim to regulate the means and methods of warfare. See, e.g.,
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
232. But see Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem.
Co., 517 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that many of the IHL norms
(particularly those concerning the means and methods of warfare) "are all simply
too indefinite to satisfy Sosa's specificity requirement"); id. ("As Plaintiffs' expert
opined, 'norms that depend on modifiers such as "disproportionate" or
"unnecessary" ... invite a case-by-case balancing of competing interests ... [and]
black-letter rules become vague and easily manipulated. They lose the definite
and specific content that Sosa seems to demand for recovery under the ATS."').
233. Article 3 of the ICTY Statute provides for jurisdiction over an
exemplary list of violations of "the laws and customs of war." Statute of the
International Tribunal art. 3, May 23, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1192.
234. Protocol I, supra note 226, art. 51(2). The Fourth Geneva Convention
protecting civilians and governing situations of occupation also prohibits "all
measures ... of terrorism against civilians." Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilian Convention]. These prohibitions are
not part of the grave breaches regime; as such, contracting parties are not obliged
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Article 13 of Additional Protocol 11,235 which identically provide that
the "civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population
are prohibited." 23 6 Neither of these provisions contemplates individual criminal liability or defines "inflicting terror" as a criminal
offense. Nonetheless, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) recognized the crime under customary
international law23 7 as a variant of the well-established customary
international law crime of "making the civilian population or
individual civilians the object of attack., 238 The ICTY set out the
following elements of the crime of terrorizing the civilian population
as follows:
1. Acts of violence directed against the civilian
population or individual civilians not taking direct
part in hostilities causing death or serious injury to
body or health within the civilian population.
2. The offender willfully made the civilian population
or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence.

to penalize such acts or subject them to universal jurisdiction, although they are
authorized to do so.
235. Protocol II, supra note 227, art. 13. Protocol I also prohibits "acts of
terrorism" against "[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or have ceased to
take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted." Id.
art. 4(1).
236. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 12 (Dec. 5,
2003). See also Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal, 10 (Nov. 22, 2002) ("[T]he principles prohibiting attacks
on civilians and unlawful attacks on civilian objects stated in Articles 51 and 52 of
Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II are principles of
customary international law.").
237. The ad hoc tribunals have recognized a number of war crimes that do
not also constitute "grave breaches" of the Conventions. These crimes are not
subject to the Conventions' mandatory universal jurisdiction regime, but universal
jurisdiction remains permitted under the treaties. See, e.g., Civilian Convention,
supra note 234, art. 146 ("Each High Contracting Party shall take measures
necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present
Convention other than... grave breaches.").
238. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 27.
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3. The above offence was committed with the primary
purpose of239spreading terror among the civilian
population.
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone specifically
20
provide for jurisdiction over the war crime of "[a]cts of terrorism.'
The Special Court similarly adopted the following constitutive
elements that must be proven along with the chapeau, or general,
elements for all Protocol II war crimes: "(i) Acts or threats of
violence directed against persons or property; (ii) The accused
intended to make persons or property the object of those acts and
threats of violence or acted in the reasonable knowledge that this
would likely occur; and (iii) The acts or threats of violence were
committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among
persons.,, 24 1 Terrorism as a war crime is only actionable where the
general elements of war crimes are present, namely the act must have
been committed within the context of an armed conflict (either
international or non-international), the victim must be a person
protected by the particular treaty or customary prohibition (such as a
civilian or a combatant hors de combat), and there must be some

239. Id. 133. Defining the crime of terrorizing civilians in terms of an
intent to cause terror is somewhat tautological. See Saul, supra note 133, at 102
(noting similar circularity in the 1937 Convention).
240. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 4(d), Nov. 8, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1602; The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, annex art. 3(d), delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). Likewise, the Department
of Defense listed terrorism as a crime prosecutable by military commission,
although it did not designate it as a war crime per se. See DEP'T OF DEF.,
MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 2, CRIMES AND ELEMENTS FOR TRIAL BY
MILITARY COMMISSION § 6(B) (2003), http://www.defenselink.mil~news/May2003
/d20030430milcominstno2.pdf (defining the crime of terrorism to involve the
intentional killing or infliction of bodily harm on persons with the intent to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion, when such conduct takes place in the
context of and in association with an armed conflict and did not constitute an
attack against a lawful military objective undertaken by military forces of a State
in the exercise of their official duties).
241. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 170 (Aug.
2, 2007).
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nexus between the act and the armed conflict, although this latter
element has been very loosely interpreted.242
Acts of terrorism may also constitute crimes against
humanity. Crimes against humanity are a constellation of acts made
criminal under international law when they are committed within the
context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population.243 Acts of terrorism may implicate certain constitutive
acts, including murder, torture, imprisonment, persecution, and other
inhumane acts. The ICC Statute defines an "attack against a civilian
population" with reference to a state or organizational policy to
commit such attack, so crimes against humanity are not expressly
limited to state action. 44 Although a policy element is not required
by most definitions of crimes against humanity, presumably many
terrorist groups could be shown to possess such a policy to attack
civilians where violent acts are employed deliberately and consistently for ideological, strategic, or political purposes. Although the
widespread or systematic attack must be directed against a civilian
population, members of the armed forces may be victims of the
242. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has
ruled that to satisfy the nexus requirement, it must be shown that the armed
conflict "played a substantial part in the perpetrator's ability to commit [the
charged crime], his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or
the purpose for which it was committed;" it was enough if, as in the present case,
"the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict."
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 58
(June 12, 2002). The Department of Defense has indicated that such a nexus could
involve, but is not limited to, the time, location, or purpose of the conduct in
relation to the armed hostilities. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 240, § 5(C).
243. The attack on the civilian population must also be either widespreadmeaning involving a substantial number of victims or "massive, frequent, large
scale action"--or systemic-meaning demonstrating a degree of organization or
orchestration or "following a regular pattern." See Aldana v. Del Monte, 416 F.3d
1242, 1247 (11 th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of crimes against humanity claim
under the ATS where plaintiffs failed to allege the existence of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F.
Supp. 2d 257, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding crimes against humanity sufficiently
pled where plaintiffs alleged that terrorist organizations used a sophisticated
financial structure to fund acts of terrorism targeting civilians); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 173, (Sept. 2, 1998) (discussing the
scale of the attack against Tutsis and sympathetic Hums, as well as the nature of
the organization and structure of the attack).
244. ICC Statute, supra note 183, art. 7.
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crimes against humanity of torture, rape, etc. 245 Post-Sosa, U.S.
courts have consistently found properly pled crimes against humanity claims to be actionable under the ATS.2 46

Terrorist attacks may also implicate the prohibition against
genocide, 24 7 where the acts target a protected group with the intent to
destroy that group. 248 The actus reus elements of killing members of

the group or causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group overlap with the actus reus of many terrorism prohibitions.
Although there are many instances of acts of terrorism being directed

against protected groups (such as those committed during "the
troubles" in Northern Ireland or even the attacks of September 11,

2001), it may be difficult to prove the specific intent to commit
genocide, the gravamen of the crime of genocide, as opposed to the
intent to intimidate or coerce a government, which is the hallmark of
terrorism.
Notwithstanding the overlap of international crimes, isolated
or exceptional violent acts, committed in times of peace (or without

any nexus to an armed conflict) and absent more widespread or
systemic repression, will not fall within the prohibitions against war
245. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
637-43 (May. 7, 1997).
246. See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (sustaining state claims under ATS
as violations of international law); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F.
Supp. 2d 457, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (sustaining crimes against humanity
claims); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180-81
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying a motion to dismiss claims brought under ATS); In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Crimes
against humanity are also deemed to be part ofjus cogens-the highest standing in
international legal norms. Thus, they constitute a non-derogable rule of international law."). This line of cases is consistent with pre-Sosa jurisprudence. See
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 150 n.18 (2d Cir. 2003)
("Customary international law rules proscribing crimes against humanity,
including genocide, and war crimes, have been enforceable against individuals
since World War II."); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1150 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) ("It is well-settled that a party who commits a crime against humanity
violates international law and may be held liable under the [ATS].").
247. International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, openedfor signature Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY Doc. No. 8115, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
248. See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (sustaining complaint containing
genocide claims in the face of a motion to dismiss alleging the failure to plead
state action).
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crimes or crimes against humanity. Likewise, where the perpetrator
does not act with the requisite specific intent, or where no protected
24 9
group is targeted, the prohibition against genocide does not apply.
The commission of physical harm by non-state actors without any
particular interrogatory or discriminatory purpose may be actionable
as terrorism where the prohibition against torture would not apply.2 5 °
Litigating acts that fall outside of other international criminal law
prohibitions under the ATS thus requires the existence of a standalone prohibition against terrorism. Even where the acts in question
implicate multiple international criminal law prohibitions, there is
expressive value in concurrent pleading, as each tort includes
elements not contained in the other. Calling violent acts both crimes
against humanity and acts of terrorism, for example, enables the
court to emphasize both the existence of a widespread and systematic
attack against a civilian population as well as the terrorist objectives
behind the attack, which may not be apparent were the acts not also
deemed acts of international terrorism.
2.

Individual Responsibility

The majority of the universal treaties address themselves to
individual-as opposed to state252-liability.2 5 3 In addition, the
249.

Genocide Convention, supra note 247, art. II.

250.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, supra note 30, art.1 (defining torture in terms of state
action and requiring that it be committed "for such purposes as obtaining from [the
victim] or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind").
251. In addition, denominating such acts as international terrorism should
trigger the robust cooperative regimes for investigation and prosecution contained
within the multilateral terrorism treaties, especially those that have received a
Security Council Chapter VII imprimatur. See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
252. Notable exceptions are the 1972 Bacteriological Weapons Convention,
supra note 164, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 164,
which contain no penal provisions and create only state, rather than individual,
obligations. Resolutions and declarations emerging from U.N. bodies are also
often addressed to states. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/60
(Feb. 17, 1995) ("States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from
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treaties are, on the whole, oriented toward penal enforcement,
although some do envision other forms of liability. 254 In addition to

organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in territories of
other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their
territories directed towards the commission of such acts.").
253. In addition, the Financing and Draft Comprehensive Conventions
specifically address civil organizational liability. In particular, the Financing
Convention notes that "Each State Party ...shall take the necessary measures to

enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its law to be held
liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity
has, in that capacity, committed an [enumerated] offence." Financing Convention,
supra note 146, art. 5(1); see also EU Framework Decision, supra note 167, art. 7
(requiring liability for actions taken "by any person acting either individually or as
part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal
person, based on one of the following: (a) a power of representation of the legal
person; (b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; (c) an
authority to exercise control within the legal person"); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note
147, art. 2(3) (addressing legal entities). The EU Framework Decision provides
that the liability of legal persons shall not exclude criminal proceedings against
natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators, or accessories in offences. EU
Framework Decision, supra note 167, art. 7(3). The Financing Convention further
confirms that organizational liability may be criminal, civil, or administrative and
should be incurred without prejudice to any individual criminal liability of
responsible individuals. Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 5(2)-(3).
254. One treaty that expressly recognizes the potential for individual (as
opposed to organizational) civil liability is a 2005 Protocol to the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The
Protocol is not yet in force. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Feb. 17,
2006, S.TREATY Doc. No. 110-8. With respect to weapons of mass destruction
and entities located in the states parties' territory or organized under their laws, the
Protocol notes that "liability [under the Convention] may be criminal, civil, or
administrative." Id. art. 5(2)(1). See also Council of Europe Convention, supra
note 182, art. 9 (suggesting the imposition of criminal, civil, or administrative
liability); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra note 177, art. 10(2) (stating
other forms of liability are to be without prejudice to the imposition of criminal
liability). Although the terrorism treaties do not specifically call on states to
provide private rights of action, in many states (and especially civil law states),
victims can append civil claims to penal proceedings, so codified causes of action
are unnecessary. See generally J.A. Jolowicz, Procedural Questions, in 11
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, pt. II, ch. 13, at 3-15
(Andre Tunc ed., 1986) (comparing the operation of the partie civile system in
various civil law countries). Scholars have proposed a comprehensive protocol to
supplement all the multilateral terrorism treaties. See Moore, supra note 76
(proposing and providing draft text of protocol for civil liability).
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prohibiting the direct commission of prohibited acts, the treaties
proscribe other preparatory and ancillary offenses as well as multiple
forms of secondary involvement in the enumerated crimes of
terrorism, such as aiding and abetting, conspiracy, the provision of
financial support, threats, etc.255 The Bombing Convention, for
example, prohibits attempts and defines "commission" to include
complicity in, or the organizing or ordering of, prohibited offenses.
The treaty also directs its attention to any person who "in any other
way contribute[es] to the commission of any offenses by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. 25 This common purpose
liability exists where the defendant either had the intent to further the
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or played some role
that the group intended to commit the prohibited
with the knowledge
7
25

offence.

3.

State Versus Non-State Action

Although terrorism is often conceptualized as a tool of nonstate actors, 258 many of these treaties and instruments do not make a

255. See, e.g., Maritime Navigation Convention, supra note 159, art. 4(4)
(prohibiting attempts, abetting, complicity, and threatening to commit acts prohibited by the treaty); Montreal Hijacking Convention, supra note 136, art. 1(2)
(prohibiting attempts and complicity); Council of Europe Convention, supra note
182, arts. 5-7, 9 (prohibiting public provocation, recruitment to terrorism, training
in terrorism, etc.); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra note 177, art. 2(2)-(4)
(prohibiting inter alia threats, attempts, complicity, and engaging in a common
purpose to commit prohibited offenses). The Council of Europe Convention
makes several acts (including recruitment to terrorism) inchoate crimes, such that
they can be prosecuted even where the terrorism offense is never committed. See
Council of Europe Convention, supra note 182, art. 8.
256. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 2(3); accord Financing
Convention, supra note 146, art. 2(5)(c).
257. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 2(3). This language
contributed to the development of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine in
international criminal law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 221 (July 15,
1999) (citing Bombing Convention).
258. The 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism
defined terrorism as acts "directed against a state." See Saul, supra note 133, at 90
(stating that the 1937 Convention did not exclude "state terrorism" as long as the
terrorist acts were "directed against a state").
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distinction between state or private actors as either perpetrators 259 or
victims, 260 implying that the particular acts of terrorism are
prohibited whether committed by or against state actors. 26 1 The
1999 Financing Convention, for example, includes only limited place
or manner restrictions. 262 That said, a few treaties focus on state
actors and governmental infrastructure as targets, implying that it is
envisioned that the prohibited conduct will come from the private
sector and target the public sector. For example, the Bombing
Convention identifies prohibited targets to include "state or
governmental facilities" alongside other public or private "infrastructure facilities" providing services to the public.263 In addition, as
will be discussed below, a number of the treaties do not apply to
members of a state's armed forces.264
The application of the terrorism prohibitions to private actors
is thus uncontroversial within the international community. Indeed,
the main contemporary debate concerns whether the terrorism
prohibitions apply to state actors as well, with certain states resisting
the notion of state terrorism at the conceptual level.265 Coupled with
other developments in international law confirming that the
international criminal prohibitions against genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes apply to all individuals, regardless of their
259. See, e.g., Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 136, art. 1 (applying
to "[a]ny person").
260. See, e.g., Hostages Convention, supra note 138, art. I (applying to
hostage-taking committed in order to compel "a third party," including "a state, an
international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a
group of persons to do or abstain from doing" something in exchange for the
release of the individual).
261. But see 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2006) (prohibiting civil suits against United
States officers or employees "acting within his or her official capacity or under
color of legal authority" and "a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an
officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or her
official capacity or under color of legal authority").
262. Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 1(2); see also EU
Framework Decision, supra note 167, art. 1 (prohibiting acts irrespective of status
as a state actor).
263. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, arts. 1-2; see also Draft
Comprehensive Convention, supra note 177, arts. 1-2 (identifying state or governmental facilities, places of public use, and infrastructure facilities as prohibited
targets).
264. See infra Part III.C.2.
265. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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status as state actors,266 the terrorism treaties' relatively straightforward application to non-state actors 267 renders obsolete Judge
Edwards's concerns in Tel-Oren that international law does not
regulate the acts of private individuals.268
The emphasis on non-state action also serves to mitigate one
of the reasons identified by the Court in Sosa for taking a
"restrained" approach toward recognizing new causes of action
under the ATS: the potential for such cases to impact U.S. foreign
policy and complicate foreign relations.269 In particular, the Court
invoked the thorny situation of U.S. courts placing limits on the
power of foreign governments over their own citizens,27 ° while
acknowledging that this is a primary focus of modem international
266. The Second Circuit and other courts have confirmed that many
international torts (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) do
not include state action as a substantive element. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (noting that a relevant consideration to ATS
jurisdiction is whether the "scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual" and comparing Tel-Oren and Kadic); Kadic v. Karad~i6, 70 F.3d 232,
239-41 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or by
private actors); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 293 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (finding no effect on defendant bank's liability where state action was
lacking).
267. Saperstein
v.
Palestinian
Auth.,
No. 04-20225-CIV-SEITZ
/MCALILEY, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92778, at *23 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2006)
("[Some] cases reflect the trend toward finding that certain conduct violates the
law of nations whether committed by a state or a private actor, however, which
conduct falls into this realm has not been completely defined.").
268. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (noting Judge Edwards's
concern with whether international law addressed state action). Indeed, a year
after Tel Oren, the D.C. Circuit stated, in dicta, that "this obscure section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 ... may conceivably have been meant to cover only private,
nongovernmental acts that are contrary to treaty or the law of nations-the most
prominent examples being piracy and assaults upon ambassadors," although the
court considered the claims alleged to require a showing of state action. SanchezEspinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
269. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (noting "the potential implications for the foreign
relations of the United States" of recognizing new causes of actions).
270. Id. ("It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits
on our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another to consider
suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign
governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its
agent has transgressed those limits.").
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law. 271 Where terrorism cases involve non-state action, U.S. courts
are less likely to find themselves considering to what extent the
policies or practices of a foreign sovereign violate international law.
Indeed, the United States government has less actively intervened in
terrorism cases involving non-state actors2 72 than it has in human
rights cases. 273 Moreover, the judicial abstention doctrines-such as
276
27
274
international comity,2 75 and political question
the act of state,
271. Id. ("Yet modem international law is very -much concerned with just
such questions .... ").
272. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 285 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) ("[T]he United States ... opted to make no statement to the court regarding
its position on the cases at hand."). Indeed, in Boim, the U.S. government in an
amicus brief, submitted at the request of the Seventh Circuit on interlocutory
appeal, supported the availability of secondary civil liability under the ATA on the
ground that § 2333 was meant to incorporate basic common law tort principles.
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (identifying common law tort
principles of accomplice liability)).
273. Even in situations in which the Executive Branch does weigh in on an
ATS case, courts have not necessarily treated these views as determinative in
respect for the separation of powers principle. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18410
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (upholding a claim even where the United States
submitted a Statement of Interest expressing concerns regarding the impact of the
litigation on U.S. foreign affairs and on Canada's foreign policies towards Sudan).
274. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) ("The
act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory.").
275. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he only
issue of international comity properly raised here is whether adjudication of [the]
case by a United States court would offend amicable working relationships with [a
foreign country].").
276. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."); see Ungar v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 280-82 (lst Cir. 2005) (rejecting defendants'
political question defense on grounds that the ATA directs courts to consider
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doctrines-are less imperative where non-state action is at issue,
although Judge Robb found the latter compelling in Tel-Oren, given
the alleged involvement of the PLO and Libya in the incident in
question. 277
4.

An Internationalizing Element

Many treaties limit their application to acts that may be
deemed "international terrorism," thus excluding jurisdiction over
acts of domestic terrorism committed by state or sub-state actors
operating solely within a single state. Under many of these formulations, an act is deemed sufficiently international or transnational
when it somehow transcends national boundaries and thus involves
the interests of, or otherwise implicates, more than one state.
Accordingly, acts may be sufficiently internationalized where the
perpetrator and victim hail from different states, where the conduct is
initiated abroad or performed in more than one state, where the
perpetrator acts outside his or her home state, or where the
perpetrator seeks refuge or is captured abroad. 278 For example, the
questions of international terrorism and that the existence of legal standards
obviate the need for the court to make non-judicial policy determinations); see also
Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 162 (D.D.C. 2006)
(finding that the proliferation of terrorism-related statutes and civil remedies, the
Executive Branch's repeated condemnations of international terrorism, and
numerous judicial decisions regarding terrorism lead to conclusion that suits by
U.S. citizens against their attackers do not present non-justiciable political
questions).
277. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 3 ("This
Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State,
the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender
is found in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis under [the
territorial or active or passive nationality grounds] to exercise jurisdiction.");
Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 3 (limiting application of the convention by precluding offenses committed in a single state when the perpetrator is a
national of that state); Maritime Navigation Convention, supra note 159, art. 4
(applying to ships navigating beyond the territorial sea of a particular state or
where the perpetrator is found in a state other than the state where the offense was
committed); Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 136, art. 3 (applying to
aircraft outside of the territory of registration, even if the flight was a domestic
flight or where the perpetrator is found in a state other than the state where the
offense was committed); Montreal Hijacking Convention, supra note 136, art. 4(5)
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Hostages Convention states that it "shall not apply where the offence
is committed within a single State, the hostage and the alleged
offender are nationals of that State and the alleged offender is found
in the territory of that State.' '279 Likewise, the Protected Persons
Convention applies only to "internationally protected" persons, such
as heads of state, ministers of foreign affairs, or representatives of a
state or international organization that are entitled to immunities
under international law.280
These provisions reflect a perpetual challenge of international
criminal law codification: distinguishing international crimes from
their domestic counterparts. Many crimes of terrorism have analogs
in ordinary crimes (assault, battery, murder, mayhem) contained
within the domestic penal codes of the states on whose territory the
acts are committed. 28 1 These acts merit being the subject of a multilateral treaty regime prosecutable according to forms of
extraterritorial jurisdiction only when some internationalizing
element or transnational impact is present.282
5.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

As a final common element, the penal treaties contain a nowboilerplate jurisdictional formula that requires the nationality,
territorial, or victim state to either prosecute offenders in their midst
or to extradite them to another state283 for the purpose of prosecu-

(applying to air navigation facilities utilized in international transportation). The
Montreal Protocol also prohibits offenses in airports serving international civil
aviation. Airports Protocol, supra note 136, 2.
279. Hostages Convention, supra note 138, art. 13; see also Council of
Europe Convention, supra note 182, art. 16 (containing substantially similar
language); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra note 177, art. 4 (same).
280. Protected Persons Convention, supra note 137, art. 1.
281. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 n.7 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (distinguishing between actionable acts of terrorism and mere street crime).
282. See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity:
Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999) (noting the
difficulty of defining crimes against humanity in a way that distinguishes them
from ordinary domestic crimes).
283. These treaties almost uniformly disallow any political offense
exception to extradition. E.g., Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 11;
European Convention, supra note 182, art. 2.
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tion. 2 84 Reflecting the principle of treaty-based universal jurisdiction,285 these obligations to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut
prosequi/judicare)exist even where there is no nexus between the
state and the perpetrator or his or her actions in terms of the
traditional bases for exercising criminal jurisdiction. 28 6 Collectively,
these provisions-which act as advanced waivers by states of
jurisdictional defenses concerning their citizens287-arguably
manifest the type of "procedural consensus" about the propriety of
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of terrorism sought
by Justice Breyer in the Sosa case, 288 at least with respect to treaty
parties inter se. Where the states of the world have agreed that
criminal universal jurisdiction exists,289 they are less likely to contest
284. E.g., Maritime Navigation Convention, supra note 159, art. 6; Hostages
Convention, supra note 138, art. 5-6; Bombing Convention, supra note 162,

art. 6-8; OAU Convention, supra note
Convention, supra note 177, art. 7.

182, art. 6; Draft Comprehensive

States have entered reservations to these

provisions to the effect that they will not extradite their own nationals for
prosecution. E.g., United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 169 (Declaration
of Mozambique).
285. But see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (rejecting concept of treaty-based universal jurisdiction).
286. The EU Framework Decision establishes a rudimentary system for
prioritizing these potential bases of jurisdiction. See EU Framework Decision,
supra note 167, art. 9 (requiring cooperation between members where more than
one state is implicated by an act of terrorism and directing states to take sequential
account of the following factors: the Member State in the territory of which the
acts were committed, the Member State of which the perpetrator is a national or
resident, the Member State of origin of the victims, the Member State in the
territory of which the perpetrator was found).
287. See generally Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based
UniversalJurisdictionto Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 363
(2001) (arguing that state parties to such treaties can prosecute nationals of nonparties).
288. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761-62 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
289. Many states have enacted universal jurisdiction statutes to enable
extraterritorial prosecutions. See, e.g., United Nations Treaty Collection, supra
note 169 (Article 6(3) Notifications). Spain has the most expansive universal
jurisdiction provision addressed to terrorism. See LEY ORGANICA DEL PODER
JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] art. 23.4 (Spain) (providing for universal jurisdiction over an
undifferentiated crime of terrorism); see also United Nations Treaty Collection,
supra note 169 (noting that Spanish law already provides for universal jurisdiction
over terrorism so no special jurisdiction needs to be established upon ratification of
the Convention).
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extraterritorial or extraordinary assertions of civil jurisdiction.290
Indeed, with respect to suits within the United States, other members
of the international community may perceive civil suits under the
ATS as less intrusive than criminal suits under Title 18 or parallel
suits under the ATA. ATS cases involve only the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction over acts committed abroad, as it is international
law (presumptively binding on all states through shared treaty
obligations or customary international law) that provides the
substantive rule of decision. By contrast, criminal and ATA suits
within the U.S. also involve the exercise of prescriptive adjudication
over offenses defined by U.S. law, which may be sui generis (such
as the laws penalizing the provision of material support to
terrorism).29 1
C.

Elements Lacking a Complete Consensus

The elements just discussed-those prohibiting certain
violent acts, providing for individual or organizational responsibility,
equally condemning state and non-state action, requiring an
international component, and permitting an expansive extraterritorial
jurisdiction-are common to many definitions of terrorism in U.N.
instruments and multilateral treaties. International terrorism definitions show some variation in two key areas, one more intractable
than the other: the requirement of a secondary or enhanced mental
state (often defined as either a terrorist motive or a specific intent to
accomplish some objective beyond the commission of the act of
violence itself) and the interface between the law governing
terrorism and international humanitarian law, or the law of armed
conflict.
290.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762.

291. In enacting the material support statutes, however, Congress indicated
it was invoking its power under Article I, § 8, Clause 10, of the U.S. Constitution,
to "define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations" and thus appears to
have determined that providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization
is a violation of the law of nations. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996)
(stating the Constitution provides Congress the power to punish crimes against the
laws of nations and carry out treaty obligations, therefore allowing Congress to
impose penalties relating to the provision of material support to foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity).
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The Terrorist Mental State

Some minor variations exist in the terrorism prohibitions
concerning the required mental state. The prosecution of acts of
terrorism, like most non-regulatory crimes, requires a showing that
the defendant possessed a particular mental state. Variation exists,
however, in how this mental element is framed in the various definitions of terrorism. Like many international crimes, formulations of
terrorism envision multiple mental states as defining elements.292
The primary mens rea is that associated with the underlying actus
reus element or constitutive act and usually involves intentional
conduct. The Bombing Convention, for example, identifies the
relevant mens rea as one of specific intent by prohibiting enumerated
acts undertaken with "the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury; or... the intent to cause extensive destruction of [a] place [of
public use], facility or system, where such destruction results in or is
likely to result in major economic loss. 293 By contrast, the
or
Financing Convention also prohibits knowingly providing
2 94
terrorism.
of
acts
out
carry
to
used
be
to
funds
collecting
In addition, many definitions of terrorism, especially in
domestic law or the regional instruments, require proof of the existence of some secondary mental state over and above the general
intent to commit prohibited acts of violence. 295 In some cases, this
292. The crime of genocide, for example, requires a showing that prohibited
conduct was committed with the specific intent to destroy a protected group in
whole or in part. Genocide Convention, supra note 247, art. II. Crimes against
humanity are defined in terms of a primary mens rea and a knowledge element; the
prosecution must show that the acts in question were committed in the context of a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population with knowledge of
that attack. ICC Statute, supra note 183, art. 7.
293. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 2(1).
294. Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 2(1).
295. The definition of international terrorism under U.S. law, for example,
requires a showing of a terrorist mental state. See 18 U.S.C. § 233 1(1)(B) (2006)
(defining "international terrorism" as acts that "appear to be intended (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping). Canadian law is in
accord. See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.01(l)(b)(ii)(E) (1985),
amended by 2001 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.) (defining terrorism as acts committed "(A) in
whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause,
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mental element is aimed at the civilian population (the intent to
cause terror) or a government (the intent to influence a
government).296 For example, the Hostages Convention prohibits the
detention of a hostage "in order to compel a third party, namely, a
State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or
juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing
any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
hostage.",297 A Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation focused on a broad array of potential motivations:
"[A]ny offence committed by individuals or groups
resorting to violence or threatening to use violence
against a country, its institutions, its population in
general or specific individuals which, being motivated
by separatist aspirations, extremist ideological conand (B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a
segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security,
or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person,
government or organization is inside or outside Canada .. ").See generally G.A.
Res. 49/60, supra note 252, annex 3 (condemning "criminal acts intended or
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes ...whatever the considerations of a
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature
that may be invoked to justify them"); Ben Saul, The Curious Element of Motive in
Definitions of Terrorism: Essential Ingredient-Or Criminalising Thought, in
LAW AND LIBERTY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 28, 31-34 (Andrew Lynch et al. eds.,
2007) (discussing motive elements in various other countries' terrorism statutes).
296. FIRooz E. ZADEH, ISLAM VERSUS TERRORISM 23 (2002) ("It is difficult
to leave the motivation out of the definition.").
297. Hostages Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1); see also Draft
Comprehensive Convention, supra note 175, art. 2(1) (defining an offense as any
act intentionally committed in order to damage a government facility, public
transportation system, communication system, or infrastructure with the intent to
cause destruction likely to result in economic loss). Claims seeking damages for
hostage-taking will fail where this intentionality requirement is not satisfied. See
Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 94-95 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (dismissing hostage taking claim under the FSIA on ground that plaintiffs
did not allege that they were detained in order to compel some particular result as a
condition for their release); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45, 46
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting incorporation in the FSIA of the definition of hostagetaking from the Hostages Convention and finding plaintiffs had adequately alleged
the existence of a quid pro quo arrangement for their release).
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ceptions, fanaticism or irrational and subjective
factors, is intended to create a climate of terror among
official authorities, certain individuals or groups in
society, or the general public. 298
These mental state formulations reflect several features of
terrorism. For one, they recognize that with the exception of cases of
assassination, the victims of terrorism are not usually targeted
individually; rather, they are targeted at random in order to achieve
some ulterior or collective purpose (usually the creation of fear or
terror in order to bring about a change in a governmental or organizational policy 299). These mental state elements also help to
distinguish crimes commonly understood to constitute terrorism
from ordinary domestic crimes, whose prosecution requires no
showing of any special ideological, political, or religious motive or
purpose and which are generally committed for personal reasons of
greed, sadism, or vengeance. Terrorism is thus viewed as violence
of a different quality than that involved in ordinary crimes. As one
scholar has noted:
The core premise is that political violence or violence
done for some other public-oriented reason (such as
religion, ideology, or race/ethnicity) is conceptually
and morally different to violence perpetrated for
private ends (such as profit, jealously, animosity,
hatred,0 revenge, personal or family disputes and so
on).
298.

30

Eur. Parl. Ass., European Democracies Facing Up to Terrorism, 25th

Sess., RECOMMENDATION No. 1426, 5 (1999), available at http://assembly.coe
The recommendation also
.intlDocuments/AdoptedText/ta99/EREC1426.htm.
considered the possibility of setting up a European court to prosecute acts of
terrorism. Id. 16(v); see also EU Framework Decision, supra note 167, art. I
(defining terrorist offenses as those committed with the aim of seriously
intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously
destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, economic or social structures of
a country or an international organization).

299. See Cassese, supra note 223, at 939 (arguing that the spreading of fear
inherent to terrorism is a means for compelling a government or other institution to
change course in some way).
300. Saul, supra note 295, at 29.
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Finally, defining terrorism with reference to particular objectives or
motivations leaves open the possibility of carving out exceptions to
these prohibitions for "legitimate" struggles.30 '
It is often unclear if this additional mental element is the
equivalent of a specific intent requirement (along the lines of the
definition of genocide which is predicated upon the intent to destroy
a protected group) or a motive element under classical criminal law
terminology. 302 Specific intent has historically been defined as an
intent to do some further act or achieve some further or more remote
consequence beyond the conduct that constitutes the actus reus of
the crime. For example, burglary-the breaking and entering into of
a dwelling of another-requires a showing of the specific intent to
commit a felony therein. To secure a conviction, the prosecution
must prove the existence of this specific intent as an additional
element of a crime. The concept of specific intent often elides with
that of motive, which is the perpetrator's guiding purpose or ulterior
intention, i.e., the reason for which an intended criminal act is
committed. Normally, proof of motive is not required for a criminal
conviction, although proving the defendant's motive is often an
integral part of any prosecution with particular relevance during the
sentencing phase. 303 One notable exception to this general trend
involves hate or bias crimes, which may require proof that the
defendant was motivated by animosity toward a protected group. 304
301. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
302. In either case, the additional terrorism mental state raises the burden of
proof for prosecution. See R v. Mallah (2005), 154 A. Crim. R. 150 (N.S.W. Sup.
Ct.) (Austl.) (terrorism acquittal where it was unclear whether defendant meant to
advance a political, religious, or ideological cause with his actions), available at
Including
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supremect/2005/358.html.
motive as a criminal element may also have human rights implications as an
infringement on protected freedoms of conscience, religion, thought, expression,
or belief. R v. Khawaja, 04-G30282, [2006] O.J. No. 4245 QUICKLAW (Ont.
Super. Ct. of Justice Oct. 24, 2006) (Can.); Kent Roach, The Casefor Defining
Terrorism with Restraint and without Reference to Political or Religious Motive,
in LAW AND LIBERTY IN THE WAR ON TERROR, supra note 295, at 39, 43-44.
303. Saul, supra note 295, at 28 ("Motive is anathema to criminal lawyers,
who are schooled in the overriding importance of the intention behind conduct and
the irrelevance of the motivations underlying it.").
304. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 2008) (criminalizing injury
or threat to person or damage to property because of actual or perceived "race,
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A review of the treaty definitions reveals that anti-terrorism
instruments generally focus on either prohibited methods or
prohibited objectives. Indeed, the more specific the actus reus of the
treaty is, the less likely a secondary mental state element is included.
By contrast, where the definition is broader or undifferentiated, an
enhanced mental state element is usually present. Scholars have
described these two definitional approaches as inductive (setting
forth a precise and targeted definition of a crime with no additional
mental state) and deductive (setting forth a broad and all encompassing definition of prohibited violence accompanied by an additional
mental state).3 °5 The Bombing Convention, for example, encourages
prosecution for prohibited acts "in particular where they are intended
or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a
group of persons or particular persons. ' 30 6 In the Bombing
Convention, this secondary mental state also constitutes a jurisdictional hook. In addition to mandating the exercise of jurisdiction
over violators of the treaty according to the standard grounds of
territoriality, nationality, and universal criminal jurisdiction, state
parties to the Bombing Convention are also entitled to assert
jurisdiction over acts committed "in an attempt to compel that State
to do or abstain from doing any act," even if no other nexus to the
prosecuting state exists. 30 7 By contrast, the Hague Hijacking
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation").
See generally Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crimes Statutory Provisions,
http://www.adl.org/leam/hatecrimeslaws/map_frameset.html (last visited Jan. 7,
2009). The U.S. federal hate crimes legislation reaches only crimes targeting an
individual because of his or her actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national
origin, and only while the victim is engaging in a federally-protected activity, like
voting, jury service, or attending school. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2006).
305. See Geoffrey Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U. L.
REv. 97, 97 (1986) (noting that deductive definitions are deemed "terrorism"
whereas inductive definitions do not necessarily categorize themselves as such);
Saul, supra note 295, at 30 (arguing that the inductive definitions do not reflect
what is distinctive about terrorism and "reach considerably beyond common
understandings of terrorism, since violence for public and private motives alike is
equally criminalised").
306. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 5.
307. Id. art. 6(2)(d); see also Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra note
177, art. 7(e) (establishing the state's jurisdiction over any offense which is
committed in an attempt to compel that state to do or to abstain from doing any
act).
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Convention contains no additional mental state, but provides a very
precise and narrow definition of prohibited conduct.3 °8
Most U.S. code penal provisions within Chapter 133B and
denominated as terrorism crimes do not contain an additional
terrorist mental state. Rather, the crimes in question are defined
solely in terms of their objective conduct (some violent act) and the
mental state associated with that conduct (e.g., acting intentionally or
knowingly). With respect to crimes against U.S. citizens, however,
the existence of a terrorist mental state is a certification precondition
for commencing a prosecution. 30 9 Other code provisions require that
an organization or state involved in the crime has previously been
designated as a terrorist entity.
Given this variation in the law,
and the way in which the terrorist mental state serves to distinguish
crimes of terrorism from ordinary domestic crimes, any customary
international law prohibition of undifferentiated acts of terrorism
would likely address only violent acts committed with a secondary
mental state.
2.

Interface with International Humanitarian Law

A more thorny area in which an international consensus
about the definition of terrorism has been elusive concerns the
applicability of the terrorism prohibitions in the context of armed
conflicts, whether international or non-international. In some cases,
international terrorism instruments disclaim their applicability
altogether whenever IHL applies. In certain regional treaties, by
308. Hague Hijacking Convention, supra note 136, art. 1.
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (requiring certification by Attorney General or
designate that the offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a
government or civilian population).
310. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (making it a crime to receive military-type
training from a designated foreign terrorist organization). This provision was
added to the code after it became clear that merely training with a designated
terrorist organization may not constitute the provision of material support or
resources to a terrorist organization under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. See United States v.
Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 571-72 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("Thus, in Section 2339B,
providing 'personnel' to [the Taliban] necessarily means that the persons provided
to the foreign terrorist organization work under the direction and control of that
organization. One who is merely present with other members of the organization,
but is not under the organization's direction and control, is not part of the
organization's 'personnel."').
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contrast, it is only where an armed struggle is considered just that
these instruments deem themselves inapplicable. In either case,
applying the terrorism prohibitions to situations involving acts of
violence by or against civilians and combatants remains problematic
given that IHL also regulates, and at times privileges, such conduct
in situations of armed conflict.
Recognizing the potential overlap between crimes of
terrorism and types of violence committed within armed conflicts,
several of the sectoral multilateral terrorism treaties (particularly the
more recent ones) exclude situations of armed conflict or the actions
of armed forces from their scope of application altogether. The
Bombing and Nuclear Terrorism Conventions,311 for example,
provide that their terms do not affect the rights, obligations, and
responsibilities of states and individuals under international humanitarian law. 312 Their preambles further indicate that "the activities of
military forces of States are governed by rules of international law
outside the framework of this Convention.' ' 31 3 Later, the treaties
state that:

311. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 19(1); Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, supra note 161, art. 4(1); see also Draft Comprehensive Convention,
supra note 177, art. 20(1) (altering this formulation somewhat to read: "Nothing
in the present Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities
of States, peoples and individuals under international law, in particular the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and international
humanitarian law").
312. Likewise, the U.S. statute codifying the Bombing Convention does not
apply to "(1) the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms
are understood under the law of war, which are governed by that law, [or] (2)
activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official
duties." 18 U.S.C. § 2332f. By contrast, the federal crime denominated as "acts of
terrorism transcending national boundaries" does apply where a member of the
uniformed services is the target of act of killing, kidnapping, assault, etc. within
the United States where the conduct transcends national boundaries. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b.
313. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, pmbl. Likewise, the Plastic
Explosives Convention partially exempts unmarked plastic explosives held by
authorities of a state party performing military or police functions. Plastic
Explosives Convention, supra note 162, arts. III-IV. The airplane hijacking
conventions do not apply to aircraft utilized for military, police, or customs
purposes. See, e.g., Montreal Hijacking Convention, supra note 136, art. 4(1)
(expressly excluding aircrafts used for such purposes).
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The activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that
law, are not governed by this Convention, and the
activities undertaken by military forces of a State in
the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they
are governed by other rules of international
law, are
314
Convention.
this
by
not governed
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention confirms that this latter
text "shall not be interpreted as condoning or making lawful
otherwise unlawful acts, or precluding prosecution under other
laws." 315 The Preambles of the Nuclear Terrorism and Bombing
Conventions similarly note that "the exclusion of certain actions
from the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make
lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other
laws. 3 16
These savings clauses emphasize that conduct not
governed by the terrorism treaties by operation of IHL, such as
deliberate attacks on civilians during an armed conflict, is not
rendered lawful by its exclusion from the terrorism treaties. Rather,
these provisions assume that such conduct may be unlawful and
prosecutable under IHL.
These latter ideas find expression in the text of the Draft
Comprehensive Convention, as well,317 although a proposal to
amend this provision reverses the emphasis: "Nothing in this
Convention makes acts unlawful which are governed by international

314. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 19(2); Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, supra note 161, art. 4(2); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra
note 177, art. 20(2); see also EU Framework Decision, supra note 167, pmbl.
("(11) Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are
governed by international humanitarian law within the meaning of these terms
under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international
law, actions by the armed forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties
are not governed by this Framework Decision.").
315. Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 161, art. 4(3).
316. Id. pmbl.; Bombing Convention, supra note 162, pmbl.
317. Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra note 177, art. 20(4) ("Nothing
in the present article condones or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, nor
precludes the prosecution under other laws.").
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38
humanitarian law and which are not unlawful under that law." 1
This latter proposed formulation indicates that lawful acts of warsuch as violent confrontations between privileged combatants or
attacks by privileged combatants against lawful targets-would not
be not rendered unlawful acts of terrorism by operation of the
proposed treaty. 319 Collectively, these treaty provisions seem to treat
IHL as the lex specialis in situations of armed
conflict, effectively
320
displacing the treaty rules governing terrorism.
These exclusion clauses depend, of course, upon a
determination of when IHL applies. Although certain situations,
such as a full-scale armed conflict between two nation-states, clearly
trigger IHL, a degree of indeterminacy and contestation remains
regarding what level of organized violence on the ground constitutes
an armed conflict subject to the rules and protections of IHL.
Notwithstanding some treaty provisions 32 1 and jurisprudence

318. Proposal to Facilitate Discussion by the Friends of the Chairman of
the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate InternationalTerrorism, delivered
to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/60/INF/1 (Oct. 20, 2005).
319. The United States made a reservation to this effect to the Financing
Convention when it stated upon ratification that "nothing in this Convention
precludes any State Party to the Convention from conducting any legitimate
activity against any lawful target in accordance with the law of armed conflict."
United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 169.
320. A softer lex specialis approach would displace the terrorism prohibitions only when there was a specific rule of IHL that "governed" the act in
question. Under this approach, given that IHL does not prohibit or indeed speak to
many acts of unlawful belligerency, the terrorism prohibitions may remain
applicable in armed conflicts when unprivileged belligerents commit acts that
would otherwise fall within the treaty prohibitions.
321. The Geneva Conventions themselves provide little insight into the
question of their field of application, indicating at Article 2 only that the bulk of
their provisions apply to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them." POW Convention, supra note 226,
art. 3. Article 1(4) of Protocol I applies to those situations governed by the four
Geneva Conventions and extends the status of international armed conflict to
include "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination." Protocol I, supra note 226, art. 1(3), (4). Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Conventions creates a mini-regime governing armed conflicts "not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties" without further definition. It is not until Protocol I1, which elaborates on
and expands common Article 3, that we find a clear statement that its provisions
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clarifying when IHL is triggered, 322 the international community has
yet to settle on a determination of when a single attack 323 or when

do not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not
being armed conflicts." Protocol II, supra note 227, art. 1(2). In addition,
Protocol II applies to armed conflicts in which Protocol I does not apply "and
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement
this Protocol." Id. art. 1(1). Thus, there may be non-international armed conflicts
that are governed by common Article 3 alone, because they do not satisfy the
territorial or organizational requirements of Protocol II.
322. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
has ruled that:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory
under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place
there.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995). This definition does not
appear to apply to situations in which a state's armed forces are embattled with
organized and armed non-state actors operating outside of the state. This
omission, however, is likely due to the fact of its relative inapplicability to the
situation in the former Yugoslavia.
323. The U.S. Department of Defense has determined that a "single hostile
act or attempted act may provide sufficient basis for [a] nexus [between the
conduct and an armed conflict] so long as its magnitude or severity rises to the
level of an 'armed attack' or an 'act of war,' or the number, power, stated intent or
organization of the force with which the actor is associated is such that the act or
attempted act is tantamount to an attack by an armed force." DEP'T OF DEF., supra
note 240, § 5(C), at 3; see also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 55/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 98, doc. 6 rev.
155-56 (1998)
(determining that a carefully planned and coordinated, if short, armed attack on a
barracks constituted an armed conflict triggering IHL).
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sustained, but sporadic, attacks over time constitute an armed
conflict in the aggregate, especially with respect to non-international
armed conflicts (i.e., those conflicts not pitting two nation-states
against each other).324
In addition, IHL does not apply uniformly to situations of
international versus non-international armed conflicts. Accordingly,
determining what rule's of IHL apply requires an exercise in conflict
classification. Many fewer IHL treaty rules apply to non-international armed conflicts, and non-state combatants in such conflicts are
not privileged to engage in acts of violence. As the quoted text
above reveals,325 terrorism conventions often make certain
distinctions with respect to their applicability to the formal military
forces of a state on the one hand, and to militia or other armed forces
not linked to a state on the other. For example, several recent
terrorism treaties define "military forces of a State" as "the armed
forces of a State which are organized, trained and equipped under its
internal law for the primary purpose of national defence or security
and persons acting in support of those armed forces who are under
their formal command, control and responsibility., 326 The alternative and undifferentiated term "armed forces" is not specifically
defined, but presumably includes both privileged and unprivileged
combatants (such as irregular, insurrectionary, insurgent, or rebel
forces operating within a non-international armed conflict).
By these provisions, the actions of all armed forces in all
armed conflicts, however classified, are not governed by the
terrorism treaties on the assumption that these actions are governed

324.

For example, the Supreme Court has determined that, at a minimum,

common Article 3 applies to the "Global War on Terror." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006).

325. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 19(2) ("The activities of
armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under
international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed
by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in
the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules
of international law, are not governed by this Convention.").
326. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 1(4); Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, supra note 161, art. 1(6); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra
note 177, art. 1(2).
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by IHL. 327 Furthermore, the actions of the formal military forces of
a state are not governed by the treaty at all, even apparently in times
when IHL does not apply. 328 Within these non-war circumstances,
the states' armed forces are deemed to be governed by "other rules of
international law," language which has been interpreted to make
reference to the regulation of the conduct of a state's armed forces by
national law, national codes of military justice, and rules of
engagement. 329 By contrast, non-state armed forces (rebels and the
like) are still governed by the terrorism treaties in situations in which
IHL does not apply, i.e., for peacetime acts of violence. Several
treaty signatories (e.g., Cuba and Turkey) have objected that this
formulation calls for the prosecution of enumerated acts of terrorism
(e.g., the usage of prohibited explosive devices or nuclear weapons)
when committed by non-state actors in situations outside of IHL but
does not condemn the very same acts committed by state actors in
the same circumstances. 330 This apparent asymmetry gives rise to
the perception that acts of state terrorism perpetrated by members of
the state's armed forces are essentially insulated from opprobrium
under the treaty.
Many of these provisions apply regardless of how the armed
conflict is classified, whereas others are limited to certain classes of
conflict. The Hostages Convention, for example, indicates that it
does not apply to situations covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions or their Protocols 33 1 in so far as state parties are bound under
327. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 19(2); Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, supra note 161, art. 4(2); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra
note 177, art. 20(2).
328. Bombing Convention, supra note 162, art. 19(2); Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, supra note 161, art. 4(2); Draft Comprehensive Convention, supra
note 177, art. 20(3).
329. U.N. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 208, 16.
330. Id. 10; United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 169. Cuba
declared that "the undue use of the armed forces of one State for the purpose of
aggression against another cannot be condoned under the present Convention,
whose purpose is precisely to combat, in accordance with the principles of the
international law, one of the most noxious forms of crime faced by the modem
world. ... The Republic of Cuba also interprets the provisions of the present
Convention as applying with full rigour to activities carried out by armed forces of
one State against another state in cases in which no armed conflict exists between
the two." Id.
331. Hostages Convention, supra note 138, art. 12. The Article reads in full:
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those conventions to prosecute or extradite hostage-takers. Although
the two Protocols prohibit hostage-taking, neither renders such act a
war crime nor obligates the prosecution or extradition of
offenders. 332 Likewise, common Article 3, applicable within noninternational armed conflicts, does not create such obligations. Only
the Fourth Geneva Convention specifically obligates states to seek
out and prosecute individuals alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, hostage-taking 333 when committed against
individuals protected by that treaty within an international armed

In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of
war victims or the Additional Protocols to those Conventions are
applicable to a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so far as States
Parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute
or hand over the hostage-taker, the present Convention shall not apply to
an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as
defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto,
including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4, of
Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
332. Protocol I lists the prohibition against hostage taking as among its
Fundamental Guarantees, which are applicable at all times, whether committed by
civilians or by combatants (privileged or unprivileged), to be enjoyed by all
persons in the power of a Party to the conflict who do not benefit from more
favorable treatment under the Conventions or the Protocol. Protocol I, supra note
226, art. 75(c). Likewise, Protocol II, which contains no penal regime whatsoever,
also treats the prohibition against hostage taking as a Fundamental Guarantee,
applicable in all times with respect to all persons who do not take a direct part, or
who have ceased to take a part, in hostilities. Protocol II, supra note 227,
art. 4(2)(c).
333. See Civilian Convention, supra note 234, art. 146 ("Each High
Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and
shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, . . . hand such persons over for trial to another High
Contracting Party concerned, provided that such High Contracting Party has made
out a prima facie case.").
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conflict. 334 If read literally, this article within the Hostages
Convention suggests that the penal obligations within the Hostages
Convention continue to apply to full effect in non-international
armed conflicts and with respect to individuals not covered by the
Fourth Geneva Convention (such as privileged combatants or
prisoners of war) within international armed conflicts. It is only
where civilians are the victims of hostage-taking that the Fourth
Geneva Convention is applicable to the exclusion of the Hostages
Convention. Similarly, the United Nations Convention expressly
excludes its application only in situations of international armed
conflicts. Specifically, it protects United Nations and associated
personnel, except where such "personnel are engaged as combatants
against organized armed forces and to which the law of international
armed conflict applies." 335 This too implies that the United Nations
Convention continues to govern the seizure of U.N. personnel in
non-international armed conflicts (and in peacetime situations).
The Financing Convention, which does not distinguish
between classes of conflict, takes a somewhat more nuanced stance
toward the interface between the terrorism prohibitions and
violations of IHL. In addition to incorporating a number of extant
terrorism treaties, the Convention prohibits the financing of activities
that will, among other things, "cause death or serious bodily injury to
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict."3 6 This latter provision
334.

Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention considers hostage taking

to be a war crime when committed within an international armed conflict and
targets a person protected by that Convention. Id. art. 147. Specifically, Article 4
of the Fourth Convention protects "[p]ersons ... who, at a given moment and in
any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals." Id. art. 4. The Article withholds protection for nationals of a state that
is not bound by the Convention, as well as nationals of a neutral state who are in
the territory of a belligerent state and nationals of a co-belligerent state while their
state of nationality has normal diplomatic representation in the state in whose
hands they are. Id. The Fourth Geneva Convention acts as a "catch all" for
persons not protected by one of the other four Conventions (governing the
wounded and sick, the shipwrecked, and prisoners of war). Id. art. 147.
335. United Nations Convention, supra note 137, art. 2(2). Likewise,
Article 20(1) states that nothing in the Convention shall affect the applicability of
IHL in relation to the protection of United Nations personnel. Id. art. 20(1).
336. Financing Convention, supra note 146, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
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suggests that even in an armed conflict also governed by IHL,
victims of terrorism under the treaty can include a state party's
combatants when they are hors de combat-whether by injury,
capture, or surrender--or even perhaps when not actively engaged in
combat (e.g., when off-duty). Under this framework, the funding of
violent acts committed by unprivileged belligerents against a state's
regular armed forces in an armed conflict would not constitute a
violation of the Financing Convention. For example, had these
events occurred within the context of an armed conflict, however
classified, the financing of the bombing of the Khobar Towers
barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996337 or the 2000 attack on the U.S.S.
Cole in Yemen 338 would not violate the Financing Convention,
because the individuals targeted were not hors de combat. By
contrast, absent the existence of an armed conflict, as was the case
with respect to both those events, the treaty would presumably
condemn and create a duty to prosecute the provision of financial
support for those acts because they violated the Bombing
Convention, incorporated by reference into the Financing
Convention.
As is apparent, when acting collectively the international
community has not fully or consistently demarcated the spheres of
application of the terrorism treaties and IHL. There are some areas
of certainty, however. Given that IHL privileges certain forms of
violence under certain conditions, the terrorism treaties must be
interpreted in a way that ensures that acts of violence that are lawful
under IHL are not rendered unlawful as acts of terrorism. So, for
example, attacks by privileged belligerents against other privileged
belligerents are inherent to international armed conflicts and cannot
be deemed to contravene any prohibition against terrorism. In
addition, all states agree that there are violent acts committed within
situations that are unregulated by IHL that may be classified as acts
337.

See Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C.

2006) (suit against Iran for providing material support to group that carried out
Khobar towers attack against a peacetime deployment of coalition troops).
338. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 412 F. Supp. 2d 99, 114 (D.D.C.
2006) ("If... Sudan furnished bin Laden and al Qaeda with, among other things,

shelter, security, financial and logistical support (including the movement of
weapons into and out of the country), and business opportunities-it would not be

unreasonable for a factfinder to conclude that such support was a necessary
condition for the bombing, and therefore a factual cause of plaintiff's damages.").
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of terrorism. These include violent attacks against civilians outside
of a state of armed conflict. In general, however, states are not
willing to treat acts committed by privileged combatants (i.e., a
state's own armed forces) against civilians outside of armed conflict
as crimes of terrorism. In addition, there remain situations in which
both the terrorism treaties and IHL may apply, depending on
technical factors such as conflict classification and the status of the
victims or perpetrators. Violent attacks by either privileged or unprivileged combatants against civilians within a state of armed conflict,
however classified, constitute war crimes and can be prosecuted as
such. 339 These acts may be regulated by both IHL and the prohibitions against terrorism, although theoretically, no terrorism
prohibition is necessary in this context as the war crimes prohibitions
cover the field.
Where the international community has yet to reach a
consensus vis-A-vis the terrorism prohibitions is with respect to the
lawfulness of attacks by unprivileged belligerents or civilians against
privileged belligerents, whether in an armed conflict or not. Absent
a situation of armed conflict, IHL is inapplicable altogether.34 °
Accordingly, there is space for a terrorism prohibition to apply,
particularly when privileged combatants are attacked, such as the
Khobar Towers and U.S.S. Cole incidents. Within the context of an
armed conflict, such attacks breach no specific provision of the
Geneva Conventions or any customary IHL rule. For the most part,
combatants are not protected persons unless they are hors de combat;
thus, IHL does not prohibit attacks on combatants by other
combatants, even unprivileged ones. 34 1 As such, there is no war
339. ICC Statute, supra note 183, art. 8. Such conduct also gives rise to
state responsibility under IHL. See Civilian Convention, supra note 234, art. 22(1)
(prohibiting "all measures ... of terrorism" against civilians in combat areas or
occupied territory); Protocol II, supra note 227, art. 4(2)(d) (prohibiting "acts of
terrorism" against "persons who do not take a direct part or have ceased to take
part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted").
340. See Protocol I, supra note 226, art. 1(4) ("The situations referred to...
include armed conflicts.").
341. By way of exception, combatants are protected from certain means and
methods of warfare (such as rape), prohibited weapons (such as those that cause
unnecessary suffering), and the use of disproportionate force. See, e.g., 1907
Hague Convention, supra note 231 (prohibiting certain means and methods of
warfare against lawful targets).
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crime of engaging in unprivileged belligerency. 342 Although IHL
does not specifically prohibit or penalize acts of unprivileged
belligerency, states are entitled to target unprivileged combatants
who participate directly in hostilities 343 and treat such individuals as
criminals upon their capture. These individuals can then be
prosecuted for breaching any applicable domestic criminal law, such
as prohibitions against treason, insurrection, assault, mayhem, or
murder. In addition, these acts of unprivileged belligerency could
also conceivably be considered acts of terrorism. If the terms of the
Bombing and Nuclear Terrorism Conventions ("The activities of
armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood
under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that
law, are not governed by this Convention"),344 are interpreted to
require that IHL be treated as the exclusive lex specialis, however,
such acts may fall outside of the terrorism treaties. This would leave
these acts essentially unregulated by international law.
By contrast to these United Nations treaties, the drafters of
some of the regional conventions have taken a different approach to
the terrorism/IHL interface and sought to exclude only a certain
category of armed conflict from the treaties' scope of application:
those involving struggles for self-determination in the face of
colonialism or occupation. The OAU Convention, for example,
provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1
[defining terrorism], the struggle waged by peoples in
342. But see DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 240, § 6(B)(3) (penalizing murder
by an unprivileged belligerent, i.e., an individual not entitled to combatant
immunity).
343. Protocol II, supra note 227, art. 13(3) ("Civilians shall enjoy the
protection afforded by this part [not to be targeted], unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities."). The International Committee of the Red
Cross in collaboration with the TMC Asser Institute is in the process of defining
exactly what constitutes the direct participation in hostilities to provide guidance
on when noncombatants lose their immunity from attack. See Avril McDonald,
The Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and the Principles of
Distinction and Protection from the Increased Participation of Civilians in
Hostilities (T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Background Working Paper, 2004), available
at http://www.wihl.nl/documents/cms-ihl-id70 1_McDonald%20DPH%20-%20
April%202004.doc.
344. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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accordance with the principles of international law for
their liberation or self-determination, including armed
struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression
forces shall not be consiand domination by foreign
345
acts.
terrorist
as
dered
Similar exclusions are found in the Arab League
Convention346 and Organisation of Islamic Unity Convention.347
Read broadly, such provisions exempt acts of violence from
condemnation as terrorism when they are committed within noninternational armed conflicts by parties with putatively noble ends.
Read broadly, this language would seem to include even violent
attacks committed against civilians, although a narrower reading
would only exclude belligerent acts committed against lawful
state in question as part of a
military objectives of the repressive
348
resistance.
armed
campaign of
These provisions reflect the fact that certain segments of the
international community are unwilling to entirely condemn the resort
to armed force in the face of putatively unjust situations of foreign
domination. 349 Thus, the jus in bello (governing the conduct of
345. OAU Convention, supra note 182, art. 3(1). The language "in
accordance with the principles of international law" may not insulate violent acts
targeting civilians or otherwise breaching IHL.
346. Arab League Convention, supra note 172, art. 2(1); see supra note
172-173 and accompanying text (describing the definitional limits in the Arab
League Convention).
347. OIC Convention, supra note 182, art. 2(a) ("Peoples' struggle including
armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and
hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the
principles of international law shall not be [considered a terrorist crime]."). The
OIC also submitted a proposal to the Working Group to the effect that the Draft
Comprehensive Convention should exclude "peoples' struggle including armed
struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed
at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of
Surya P. Subedi, The U.N. Response to International
international law."
Terrorism in the Aftermath of the TerroristAttacks in America and the Problem of
the Definition of Terrorism in InternationalLaw, 4 INT'L L.F. DU DROIT INT'L 159,
163 (2002).
348. Cassese, supra note 223, at 952-53.
349. Given the demise of most relationships of colonialism and the practice
of apartheid, the occupation of the Palestinian Territories by Israel presents the
primary concern in this regard.
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hostilities once an armed conflict has been initiated) collide with the
jus ad bellum (governing the legality of the resort to armed force ab
initio). Doctrinally, contemporary international law treats these two
bodies of law as conceptually distinct. 350 This distinction is
axiomatic: the legal evaluation of the conduct of hostilities is an
inquiry entirely independent of the legal evaluation of the lawfulness
of the resort to armed force. As a result, a just war may be fought
unlawfully, and an unjust war may be fought lawfully. 351 The
International Committee of the Red Cross thus remains strictly
agnostic about the causes of the armed conflicts in which it operates
352
but all the while strictly scrutinizes the conflicts' consequences.
Nonetheless, states in these regional treaties continue to
justify the actions of unprivileged belligerents that might otherwise
be deemed to be war crimes or acts of terrorism with reference to the
justness of the cause on behalf of which they are committed. Indeed,
there remains a deep-seated unwillingness within segments of the
international community to fully relinquish the idea that certain
forms of otherwise prohibited violence are legitimate if they are
employed in opposition to a colonial, racist, alien, occupying, or
oppressive regime by a group seeking independence or selfdetermination.
In such situations of asymmetrical power, an
armed conflict fought "according to the rules" would undoubtedly
result in a military victory for the dominant power. In the eyes of
350. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: The Dualism of Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law Of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2009).
351. Id. ("'It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for
an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules."' (quoting MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21

(1977))).

352. See, e.g., POW Convention, supra note 226, arts. 1-2 (Common
Articles I and 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 affirm that the jus in bello
codified in those treaties apply in "all circumstances" and to "all cases of declared
war or of any other armed conflict"); see also Protocol I, supra note 226, pmbl.
("[T]his Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are
protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature
or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the
Parties to the conflicts.").
353. See supra Part III.C.2. (listing instruments exempting certain forms of
conflict from condemnation); supra notes 311-319 and accompanying text
(discussing the approach taken by drafters, which sought to exclude certain
categories of armed conflicts).
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some members of the international community, the jus in bello are
subordinate to the jus ad bellum under circumstances in which the
cause is just.
The exclusion of situations of armed conflict within many
terrorism treaties finds parallels in the provisions of the ATA
precluding terrorism claims arising out of "acts of war." 354 This
provision (§ 2336(a)) betrays confusion about the potential concurrence of the prohibitions against war crimes and acts of terrorism.
Notwithstanding this clear exclusionary language, U.S. courts have
concluded that certain terrorist crimes committed during an armed
conflict by unprivileged combatants do not trigger this exception.
One line of argument focuses on the identity of the perpetrator.
Morris, for example, involved an attack against United States armed
forces in Afghanistan by alleged members of al Qaeda.355 The court
concluded that al Qaeda is a terrorist organization that, as such, does
not constitute a "military force" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(4)(C)356 that is capable of engaging in an armed conflict.357
The fact that al Qaeda operatives received military training did not
transform the organization into a military force when its members
such training "in a terroristic fashion to achieve terroristic
employed
358
ends."
354. See supra note 37 (discussing various cases where claims did not
constitute acts of war).
355. 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (D. Utah 2006). The defendant in this suit is
Ahmad Khadr, father to Omar Khadr, the child soldier detained in Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba. Id. at 1326. The United States is prosecuting the son before a military
commission for the grenade attack that serves as the basis for this civil suit. Id. at
1326-27.
356. Id. at 1333-34. In the criminal context, a U.S. court ruled that an
organization could constitute a military organization if it met three criteria, drawn
from Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention addressed to prisoners of war: (1)
it had a hierarchical command structure, (2) it generally conducted itself in
accordance with the laws of war, and (3) its members had a distinctive symbol and
carried their arms openly. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
357. This ruling is in tension with President Bush's Military Order of Nov.
13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001), which essentially states that the
United States is at war with al Qaeda, a determination that the Supreme Court to a
certain extent confirmed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-30 (2006), by
holding that common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention applies to
individuals captured in connection with the conflict with al Qaeda.
358. Morris, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
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Alternatively, courts have concluded that attacks on civilians
do not occur "in the course of' armed conflict, even where an armed
conflict was in progress in the territory in question. In Kieman, for
example, defendants argued that the situation in Israel constituted an
armed conflict within the meaning of the ATA. 359 They reasoned
that war may encompass acts that do not constitute "actual combat,"
such as attacks on civilians that may be aimed at strengthening or
weakening the interests of one side or another. 360 Defendants
insisted that attacks that implicate or violate IHL would not trigger
the ATA:
"If illegal the attack may well be a war crime and
subject to sanctions as such. However, neither the
heinousness nor legality of acts of war occurring in
the course of armed conflict is germane to the application of sec. 2336(a). Sec. 2336(a) when applicable
bars civil actions under ATA sec. 2333 for 'any act'
without regard to its nature or seriousness, or whether
the act if not barred by sec. 2336(a) would constitute
international terrorism actionable under the ATA. ' 36 '
In rejecting this argument, the court ruled in essence that an attack
be deemed to have occurred "in
on a civilian school bus could not
362
the course of' an armed conflict.

In order to escape this exclusionary clause, the court in Biton
focused instead on the lack of a nexus between the attack in question
and the ongoing armed conflict in the region. 363 Notwithstanding
that in situations of asymmetrical warfare attacks on civilians often
constitute a deliberate, if unlawful, modus operandi of non-state
359. Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163
(D.D.C. 2006).

360. Id.
361.

Id. (quoting Defendants' PA and PLO Supporting Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Their Rule 12(b) Motion at 39, Estate of
Klieman, 424 F. Supp. 2d 153 (No. 04-1173 (PLF))).
362. Id. at 166 ("As a matter of law, an act that violates established norms of
warfare and armed conflict under international law is not an act occurring in the
course of armed conflict. An armed attack on a civilian bus, such as the one
plaintiffs have alleged in the complaint, violates these established norms.").
363. See supra notes 242 & 249 and accompanying text.
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actors, the Biton court rejected an argument that the attack on
civilians constituted an "act of war" that could not trigger the
ATA. 364 Specifically, the court concluded that "the circumstances of
the alleged attack--on a recognized school bus full of students and
teachers-and the status of those non-combatants lead the Court to
conclude that the attack did not occur 'during the course of an
armed conflict as a matter of law." 365 In so ruling, the court drew on
cases applying the political offense exception to extradition, which
require a showing that the acts for which the exception is urged must
be "'acts committed in the course of and incidental to a violent
political disturbance such as a war, revolution or rebellion.' ' 366 In
dicta, however, the court noted that it might reach a different result if
the attack had not been on a school bus: "It is not immediately
obvious that an attack on a settler, who intentionally went into
Palestinian territory to claim it for Israel, would automatically and
necessarily be a 'terrorist' attack against a 'civilian. ' ' ' 367 Were the
framers of the ATA to recognize that acts of terrorism may be
committed within armed conflicts as discussed above, 368 the courts
would not have to undertake such contortions to assert jurisdiction.

IV.

THE TORT OF TERRORISM UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Notwithstanding some doctrinal uncertainty at the border
between the prohibitions contained within the terrorism treaties and
IHL, a much greater consensus about the contours of the
international prohibition against terrorism exists today as compared
with the time at which Tel-Oren was decided. In particular, the
international community has reached a consensus that specific
manifestations of terrorism are unlawful regardless of the political
context in which they are committed. 369 In many respects, this
364. Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7
(D.D.C. 2005).
365. Id.at 1-11.
366. Id. at 9 (quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir. 1981)).
367. Id. at 10.
368. These problems may also be avoided were § 2336(a) to be amended to

exclude only "lawful acts of war." In addition, where the victims are aliens, all
these claims could have conceivably been brought under the ATS as war crimes.
369.

See supra Part III.B.
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piecemeal approach has all but covered the field. Many of these
developments are already reflected in U.S. penal law and thus may
trigger civil liability pursuant to the ATA for U.S. victims.
Particularly where federal law incorporates an international
penal
370
prohibition, ATS jurisdiction should more readily exist.
Although U.S. domestic law shows greater certainty in this
area, international law remains inconclusive as to the need to show
an additional terrorist mental state with respect to all manifestations
of terrorism, beyond a few specific prohibitions that are clearly
defined without this extra mens rea element. For the purposes of
ATS litigation, until international law displays more uniformity,
ambiguity should be resolved against the pleader by requiring a
showing of a terrorist mental state for more generalized terrorism
claims that do not invoke a particularized terrorism prohibition with
its own set of elements. In addition, although there remains some
ambiguity about when acts of violence committed within an armed
conflict by unprivileged combatants would constitute terrorism,
civilian victims of attack by unprivileged belligerents should face no
barriers to pleading the commission of a tort of terrorism in violation
of the law of nations so long as the other elements of the offense are
met. (Within the context of an armed conflict, such acts may also
constitute war crimes.) By contrast, privileged belligerents (i.e.,
members of a formal armed force) who are the victims of attack by
such perpetrators, particularly within an armed conflict where certain
norms against the use of armed force are suspended, may be more
vulnerable to having their cases dismissed for failing to state a claim
of terrorism. Indeed, courts adjudicating such claims under the ATS
might be tempted to reject terrorism claims whenever IHL would
govern the situation as the lex specialis just as the ATA purports to
do. 37 1 Given that IHL does not specifically prohibit acts of unprivi-

370.

See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1182

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that where international norms are already codified
elsewhere in U.S. law, the implication is that these claims "are not impermissibly
broad because Congress has adopted statutes that define these concepts and assess
liability for these actions"); id. ("Legislative approval of punishment for these
actions would suggest that the courts may-subject to other doctrines such as
forum non conveniens-entertain these suits.").
371.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2336 (2006) ("No action shall be maintained under

section 2333 of this title for injury or loss by reason of an act of war.").
HeinOnline -- 28 Rev. Litig. 469 2008-2009

470

THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 28:2

leged belligerency, however, the only way to condemn such acts
under international law is via a terrorism prohibition.
Reviewing the cases filed so far, U.S. courts seem more
comfortable recognizing causes of action for specific terrorist acts
that are the subject of a dedicated treaty than an undifferentiated tort
of terrorism. 372 The Arab Bank cases, for example, involve claims
against the Arab Bank, PLC, for knowingly providing banking and
administrative services to various entities identified by the U.S.
government as terrorist organizations that allegedly sponsored
suicide bombings and other attacks on civilians in Israel.373
Plaintiffs are U.S. and alien citizens bringing claims under both the
ATA and the ATS, respectively. The ATA claims are premised on
allegations that the defendant bank violated, and aided and abetted
violations of, all heads of 18 U.S.C. § 2339, the material support
statute, 374 and § 2332, which prohibits attacks on, and conspiracies to
attack, U.S. nationals abroad.375 The alien plaintiffs proceeding
under the ATS similarly alleged various forms of376
support for acts of
terrorism, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
With respect to the terrorism claims, plaintiffs were relatively
restrained in their pleading, essentially alleging that the defendant
had financed a policy of suicide bombings for the purpose of
intimidating or coercing the civilian population that violated
customary international law as expressed in the Bombing

372. Likewise, in Burnett v. Al-Baraka Investment & Development Corp., a
pre-Sosa case arising out of the attacks of September 11, a district court concluded
that the ATS supported jurisdiction over acts of hijacking. 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91
(D.D.C. 2003). The influential Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
includes hijacking among the list of rules that may be said to constitute universally
accepted norms of international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987). Particular defendants in
Burnett were subsequently dismissed on foreign sovereign immunity grounds.
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2003); see
also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (holding that various Saudi officials were entitled to immunity under the
FSIA), aff'd, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008).
373. E.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
374. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
375. Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
376. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
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Convention and the Financing Convention.3 7 7 In upholding the
complaint in the face of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, the court found it
significant that these treaties were well subscribed to and had been
ratified and implemented by the United States.37 8 The court rejected
defendant's contention that there was no universal definition of
terrorism under international law because the precise acts and

specific conduct alleged by plaintiffs clearly violated existing treaty
law. 3 79 The court also rejected the contention that state practice did

not support the claims alleged, because states reserved the right of

groups to use certain forms of violence in struggles for selfdetermination. 380

The court noted that even the anti-terrorism

treaties and state reservations to those treaties that make reference to
such struggles recognize that they must be undertaken in accordance
with international law 38 1 and that no state expressly condones actions
Finally, the court determined that
such as those alleged. 382
international law provided for the liability of entities indirectly
involved 3in acts of terrorism in keeping with the relevant terrorism

treaties.

38

377. Id.
378. Id. at 257, 277, 283.
379. Id. at 280-81.
380. Id. at 281.
381. Id. at 282. The Court also cited for support Security Council
Resolution 1566, supra note 149, and the fact that the IHL principle of distinction,
which prohibits the direct targeting of civilians in armed conflict, also supports the
rule of international law pled by plaintiffs. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79.
382. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
383. Id. at 286-89. Human rights cases are largely in accord. Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (11 th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding
the TVPA and the ATS permit claims based on direct and on indirect theories of
liability); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463-64,
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[W]here a cause of action for violation of an international norm
is viable under the ATS, claims for aiding and abetting that violation are viable as
well."); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-02506, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209,
at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) ("[S]ince the early days of this country, courts
have recognized that private individuals may be held liable for aiding and abetting
violations of international law."); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the ATS includes actions
premised on theories of aiding and abetting and conspiracy); Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(collecting cases); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 52-54
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By contrast, in Saperstein v. PalestinianAuthority, plaintiffs
pled an undifferentiated tort of "terrorism" as a violation of the law
of nations in response to suicide bombings in Israel.38 4 The court
rather summarily ruled that "if the conduct of the Defendants is
construed as terrorism, then Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of
the law of nations., 385 The court cited Tel-Oren and made no
reference to more contemporary international law.386 Plaintiffs then
attempted to recast the alleged crimes as war crimes pursuant to
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which governs noninternational armed conflicts. 387 The court questioned whether
violations of common Article 3 met the two-part test established in
Sosa. First, the court doubted whether other aspects of common

Article 3-in particular the provisions prohibiting "violence to life,"
"cruel treatment," and "outrages upon personal dignity"-are

388
defined with sufficient specificity to support ATS jurisdiction.
The court further declined to allow a cause of action for the
particular conduct alleged, the murder of a civilian during an armed
conflict, in part on the grounds that to do so would open the federal
courts to a flood of claims from armed conflicts all over the world in
contravention of the Supreme Court's note of caution in Sosa.389 By

(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Even under an aiding and abetting theory, civil liability may be
established under international law."); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding conspiracy
and aiding and abetting are both actionable under the ATS).
384. Saperstein
v.
Palestinian
Auth.,
No. 04-20225-CIV-SEITZ
/MCALILEY, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92778, *26-27 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2006).
385. Id. at *26.
386. Id. at *25-26.
387. Id. at *28.
388. Id. at *30-31 ("For federal courts to interpret such ambiguous
standards to assess its own subject matter jurisdiction would pose problems for
federal courts and would not meet the defined standards of specificity that Sosa
requires.").
389. Id. at *31 ("[I]f Plaintiffs' specific allegation, i.e., the murder of an
innocent civilian during an armed conflict, was sufficient for the purposes of the
ATS, then whenever an innocent person was murdered during an 'armed conflict'
anywhere in the world, whether it be Bosnia, the Middle East or Darfur, Sudan, the
federal courts would have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Clearly,
such an interpretation would not only make district courts international courts of
civil justice, it would be in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's specific
prudential guidance admonishing lower courts to be cautious in creating new
offenses under the law of nations.").
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contrast, other federal courts have demonstrated themselves to be
more comfortable with the fluidity of claims where the prohibitions
against war crimes, crimes against humanity, and terrorism are
applicable. In the Linde case, for example, plaintiffs also pled the
same acts as war crimes and crimes against humanity, and these
claims have survived 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) motions.39 °
The courts are also quite comfortable with various forms of
secondary liability in the terrorism context. 391 These opinions
exhibit less angst than is seen in the human rights cases (particularly
those concerned with corporate liability) involving such derivative
liability, 392 perhaps because the terrorism treaties contain express

provisions calling for the criminalization of aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, and other forms of indirect participation and because
U.S. penal law is in accord.393 In particular, the international
community is increasingly concerned with the importance of
hindering the financing of terrorism, as expressed in Security
Council Resolution 1373 and the Financing Convention.394 Forms of
secondary liability are necessary to reach individuals or groups that
may not engage in terrorism directly, but may support or enable the
terrorist activities of others.

390. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571,591 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
391. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1010-11 (7th Cir.
2002) (noting Congress's intent to import general tort law principles, which
include aiding and abetting liability, into the ATA).
392. But see supra note 383 (cataloging cases in favor of the cognizability of
complicity liability under the ATS).
See generally Chim~ne I. Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 61 (2008)
(discussing variation in the human rights jurisprudence involving aiding and
abetting claims).
393. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
394. See also Council of Europe Convention, supra note 182, art. 13
(emphasizing the provision of compensation to victims); Inter-American
Convention, supra note 182, arts. 4-6 (aiming to eradicate the financing of
terrorism).
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CIVIL LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AS A
COUNTER-TERRORISM TOOL

Much has been written about the value of civil suits to
vindicate rules of international law.39
Civil litigation involving
claims of international terrorism has the potential to play a part in a
comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy, especially where military
strikes or governmental sanctions may be considered too blunt a
response, are politically unpalatable, or lack multilateral support. In
particular, by harnessing the motivation, investigative capabilities,
and resources of private attorneys general and the robust U.S. tort
system on behalf of those victims who have access to the U.S. legal
system, civil suits can enhance the government's ability to bring
targeted criminal suits, 396 aid in the rehabilitation of victims, 397 and
promote the rule of law in the face of acts of terrorism.
Because of the practicalities of obtaining personal jurisdiction over potential defendants and the possibility of real monetary
recovery, most civil terrorism cases will inevitably focus on the

395. See, e.g., H. H. Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347, 2366 (1990-91); John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of
International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 1, 47-49 (1999); Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under
InternationalLaw: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REv. 579, 581
(1997); Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic
Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141 (2001) [hereinafter Van Schaack,
In Defense]; Beth Van Schaack, With All DeliberateSpeed: Civil Human Rights
Litigation as a Tool For Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2305 (2004). In
addition, Congress has recognized the importance of civil suits in the human rights
context with the passage of the TVPA and in the terrorism context with the ATA.
See supra notes 29-30.
396. To be sure, in certain situations, the existence of terrorism suits,
particularly against foreign states under the FSIA, have complicated U.S. foreign
relations. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (noting executive action
barring recovery). In addition, civil suits do not benefit from prosecutorial
discretion, which can be exercised in a way that reflects foreign policy considerations.
397. Civil terrorism suits promote emerging international law concerning the
right to a remedy and to reparations. See Van Schaack, In Defense, supra note
395, at 165-68. They also are consistent with pronouncements from the international community calling for the compensation of victims. See, e.g., text accompanying note 151.
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organizations and entities that recruit, train, arm, fund, dispatch, or
otherwise enable terrorist groups and networks.398 Pursuing the hard
assets of entities that support terrorism also provides a unique form
of leverage over such organizations, their donors, and their
benefactors. Where assets are found, civil suits can deny defendants
the financial wherewithal to support acts of terrorism. In addition to
providing redress to victims, civil suits may deter such entities from
maintaining assets or property in the United States, as well as
prevent terrorists from benefitting from investments and soliciting
funds in the U.S. 399 Suits against private entities under the ATS, or
against entities with purposefully tenuous ties to foreign governments, avoid the pitfalls associated with suing state actors under the
FSIA and attaching governmental assets,40 ° which may be subject to
diplomatic or consular immunities or seizure by the U.S. government. 40 1 Civil suits may also yield better results than criminal suits
because they are subject to a lower burden of proof.402

This is

especially true where the criminal justice system may only obtain
custody over low-level implementers (assuming they are able to
obtain custody over anyone at all given that many direct perpetrators
ultimately take their own lives in the context of their terrorist
398.

See Strauss, supra note 32, at 682 (discussing how civil suits against

hate crimes were successful and how private citizens can enter the war on
terrorism through civil suits).
399. See Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir.
2002) (noting expansive purposes of § 2333 in supporting secondary liability).
400. See supra note 53 (discussing debate over whether the FSIA applies
where individual state actors are sued).
401. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding
governmental seizure against private claims); see also Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66
Fed. Reg. 186 (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002
/16181 .htm (authorizing "the U.S. government to designate and block the assets of
foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of
committing, acts of terrorism"). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006) (detailing
conditions under which governmental assets may be executed upon). Where the
U.S. government seizes a foreign government's assets, they are not available to
satisfy private judgments. Congress can, however, require the executive branch to
release seized assets to satisfy judgments. See Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(b), 114 Stat. 1464,
1542-43 (releasing blocked assets for victims involved in Cuban and Iranian
cases).
402. For a fuller discussion of the benefits of civil suits for terrorism, see
generally Hume & Todd, supra note 38; Moore, supra note 76.
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activities), and likely cannot reach the real architects of terrorist acts.
Even where defendants are judgment-proof, such cases have
symbolic value, contribute to norm-enunciation, and harness the
expressive functions of the law.
Recognizing terrorism causes of action under the ATS would
fill a gap in anti-terrorism litigation and ensure that citizen and noncitizen victims of acts of terrorism can sue together in a concerted
fashion.4 °3 This would remove one of the gaps in coverage of the
statutory provisions, enabling the civil enforcement of international
law violations.40 4 To be sure, the concern expressed by the court in
Saperstein about opening the floodgates to terrorism claims by
aliens40 5 with little connection to the United States other than their
ability to access our courts is a real one. A number of structural
constraints, however, limit foreign litigants' ability to pursue civil
litigation, as well as the desirability of bringing suit here. 40 6 These

403. In Ungar, for example, terrorists attacked a couple and their child in
Israel. Estate of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76,
86 (D.R.I. 2001). The couple was killed, but the child survived. Id. The
husband's estate could sue under the ATA because the decedent was a U.S. citizen.
Id. By contrast, the wife was an Israeli citizen. Id. Recognizing terrorism claims
under the ATS would enable these claims to proceed together. See also Alejandre
v. Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (noting that fourth victim was
not a U.S. citizen). In Ungar and Alejandre, the non-U.S. citizen plaintiffs could
also have brought suit under the TVPA, which also creates a cause of action for
summary execution, defined as "a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term,
however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is
lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation." Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Torture Victim Protection).
404. The fact that aliens may sue for a broader array of international law
violations under the ATS than U.S. citizens is another gap in this regime.
405. See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736 (2004) (noting
that the implications of the proposed rule "would be breathtaking" and that the rule
"would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the
world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place").
406. See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and StructuralReasonableness, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004) (noting structural constraints on the exercise of
extraterritorial civil jurisdiction with respect to the ATS); John D. Shipman,
Comment, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the New Front in
the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REv. 526 (2008) (identifying challenges to
effectuating civil terrorism suits within U.S. courts).
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include the necessity of establishing personal jurisdiction over 40 7 and

serving process

on 4 0 8

defendants; the potential for dismissal under

the doctrine of forum non conveniens; 40 9 the challenges of discov-

407. Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172,
179-80 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding no personal jurisdiction over Palestinian officials
where defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the U.S. to satisfy the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, but finding personal jurisdiction over the
Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization because they had
sufficient contacts with the U.S.). But see Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11-13
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding adequate nationwide minimum contacts as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) where defendants could reasonably expect
to be hailed into court as a result of directly targeting U.S. interests); Estate of
Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 256-57 (D.R.I.
2004) (finding Hamas had constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the
United States as a whole in light of its fundraising, public relations, money
laundering, investment, and other activities); Estate of Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at
87-88 (asserting personal jurisdiction over Palestinian Authority on the basis of its
non-United Nations activities, including its lobbying efforts, commercial contracts
and bank accounts, and its office in Washington, D.C.). See generally Ozan 0.
Varol, Substantive Due Process, Plenary-Power Doctrine, and Minimum
Contacts: Arguments for Overcoming the Obstacle of Asserting Personal
Jurisdiction over Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 92 IOWA L. REv. 297
(2006) (discussing methods that courts could use to exert personal jurisdiction over
terrorists under the ATA).
408. Any corporate defendants doing business within the U.S. can easily be
served process. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 571
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (service on bank's New York agent). But see Estate of Ungar,
304 F. Supp. 2d at 257-59 (discussing difficulties of effectuating service of
process on Hamas as an unincorporated association). Service may also be accomplished by publication in certain circumstances. See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 5, 17
(allowing service of process by publication for defendants Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda, whose whereabouts were not easily determined); Smith v. Islamic Emirate
of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).
409. The ATA contains a heightened forum non conveniens standard for
dismissal, requiring a showing that:
(1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court that has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over all the defendants;
(2) that foreign court is significantly more convenient and appropriate;
and
(3) that foreign court offers a remedy which is substantially the same as
the one available in the courts of the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 2334(d) (2006).
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ery; 4 10 the justiciability doctrines of international comity, political
question, and act of state; the potential for executive intervention;4 1
and the challenges of executing judgments against available
assets.4 12

VI.

CONCLUSION

The discussion above suggests that although the U.S. courts
have not yet fully embraced a generalized tort of terrorism, the
building blocks are in place to recognize such a cause of action under
the ATS. An international consensus now exists that violent acts
targeting civilians are per se unlawful, either as war crimes (if they
are committed within the context of an armed conflict, however
classified, with a nexus thereto), crimes against humanity (if
committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population), or terrorism (if the result of an isolated
attack outside of a state of war).4 13 Only situations in which
members of a state's armed forces are targeted by unprivileged
belligerents-within or without an armed conflict or war of national
liberation-may not be actionable under the ATS.
Doctrinal
fuzziness at the margins with regard to the illegality of attacks by
and against combatants within an armed conflict should not bar the
recognition of a universal prohibition against most manifestations of
terrorism in the majority of circumstances.

410. Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 43-44
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding discovery about financial accounts relevant to plaintiffs'

§ 2333 claims).
411. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (noting the
appropriateness of granting case-specific deference to the executive branch).
412. See generally Strauss, supra note 32, at 724-37 (examining the
obstacle to the enforcement of judgments brought against terrorist organizations
and the individuals, officials, and states that enable them).
413. Furthermore, so long as the conduct underlying the suit corresponds to
a specific terrorism prohibition as set forth in any of the multilateral treaties to
which the United States is a party or a provision of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the
case should move forward beyond the failure to state a claim phase.
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